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ABSTRACT The highly anticipated 5G network is projected to be introduced in 2020. 5G stakeholders are
unanimous that densification of mobile networks is the way forward. Densification will be realized by means
of small cell technology and it is capable of providing coverage with a high data capacity. The EU funded
H2020-MSCA project “SECRET” introduced covering the urban landscape with mobile small cells since
these take advantage of the dynamic network topology and optimizes network services in a cost-effective
fashion. By taking advantage of device-to-device communications technology, large amounts of data can
be transmitted over multiple hops and therefore offload the general network. However, this introduction of
mobile small cells presents various security and privacy challenges. Cryptographic security solutions are
capable of solving these as long as they are supported by a key management scheme. It is assumed that
network infrastructure and mobile devices from network users are unable to act as a centralized trust anchor
since these are vulnerable targets to malicious attacks. Security must therefore be guaranteed by means
of a key management scheme which decentralizes trust. Therefore, this article surveys the state-of-the-art
key management schemes proposed for similar network architectures (e.g., mobile ad hoc networks and ad
hoc device-to-device networks) which decentralizes trust. Furthermore, these key management schemes are
evaluated for adoptability in a network of mobile small cells.
INDEX TERMS 5G, Beyond 5G, Decentralized Systems, Device-to-Device Communication, Key Man-
agement, Mobile Small Cells, Security, Small Cells, Wireless Ad Hoc Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been almost a decade since the 4G mobile network was
introduced. Since that time, many more users and wireless
devices have joined the network. The number of wireless
devices connected to the network is expected to have grown
by a factor somewhere between 100 and 10,000 by 2021 [1].
These devices range from PDAs to smartphones, tablets and
machines falling within the Internet of Things (IoT) concept
[2], [3]. Furthermore, demanded mobile data is expected to
have increased by a factor of 1,000 per device by 2021 [1],
[4]. This surge puts a lot of pressure on the current 4G
network. This causes a reduction in data rates and it increases
latency and signal interference.
To address these challenges, new technologies are emerg-
ing to create the next generation 5G network [5]–[9]. These
technologies will deliver higher network capacity, allow the
support of more users, lower the cost per bit, enhance energy
efficiency and provide the adaptability to introduce future
services and devices. It is envisioned that the 5G network
will be deployed by 2020 and beyond [1], [5], [6], [10] with
data rates reaching speeds up to 10 Gb/s and delays as low as
1 ms end-to-end.
One of these emerging technologies is small cells. The
small cell technology is the most effective solution to deliver
ubiquitous 5G services in an energy efficient manner to
its users. In particular, mobile small cells are proposed to
cover the urban landscape. These can be set up on-the-fly,
based on demand, using mobile devices (i.e. user equipment)
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or Remote Radio Units (RRUs) [11]. Mobile small cells
are networks consisting of mobile devices which are within
relative close proximity. This allows device-to-device (D2D)
communications and enables high data rate services such as
video sharing, gaming and proximity-aware social network-
ing. Mobile small cells therefore negate the necessity for
network operators to install and maintain additional network
infrastructure. End-users are provided with this plethora of
5G broadband services while D2D communications improve
throughput, energy efficiency, latency and fairness [12]–[14].
The current network infrastructure guarantees secure data
transmissions between network subscribers with the distri-
bution of cryptographic keys present in SIM cards. These
keys are used to authenticate network subscribers, provides
access to network resources and establishes a secure channel
between the mobile device and the network infrastructure. In
order to set up secure D2D communications, mobile devices
require cryptographic keys which are shared between each
other. These keys require updating mechanisms to guarantee
privacy over an extended period of time and revocation
mechanisms in the event that a mobile device is maliciously
compromised and no longer correctly identifies the owner of
the device. Providing secure communication in a network
of mobile small cells requires its own key management
scheme. Traditionally, a key management scheme relies on a
centralized trusted third party (TTP). This TTP is considered
to be trustworthy and secure by every user inside the network.
It can therefore distribute cryptographic keys between any
set of network devices to set up a secure communications
channel.
A. CONTRIBUTION
This article surveys a wide spectrum of key management
schemes proposed for securing mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) as well as ad hoc D2D networks. A network of
mobile small cells could be interpreted as a hybrid between
these two types of networks, sharing many common network
characteristics such as network nodes communicating in a
multi-hop wireless fashion; network nodes function as both
hosts and routers; these networks have a dynamic network
topology; and these networks can be homogeneous or het-
erogeneous.
Key management schemes proposed for MANETs are self-
organized during network deployment due to its inability to
rely on an available and online centralized TTP. Numerous
quality surveys exist which explore proposed key manage-
ment solutions for MANETs [15]–[20]. These surveys de-
scribe individual key management schemes and evaluates
them for general infrastructureless MANETs. However, mo-
bile small cells are network infrastructure-assisted which
provide opportunities when it comes to aspects such as key
management and efficient routing.
Key management schemes proposed for ad hoc D2D net-
works consider the assistance of available network infrastruc-
ture, but do not take densification of the network into account.
There are few quality surveys related to security for D2D
communications. To emphasize, the quality surveys [21],
[22] cover many aspects of D2D communications technol-
ogy, however security was still mentioned as an open research
problem. Recently, two surveys [23], [24] about security for
D2D communications were published. These surveys cover
key management proposals of which many either assume that
the network infrastructure is secure against compromise or
they do not consider multi-hop communication.
On the other hand, the key management schemes in our
survey are selected based on their ability to self-organize
the key management to secure multi-hop D2D communica-
tions without having to rely on a fixed intrastructure and
an online centralized TTP. Furthermore, a key management
classification is provided that categorizes various approaches
of solving the key management. These approaches are treated
as a collective of key management schemes and include work
extending upon the original key management scheme. This
provides a detailed and wide scope of the potential of a key
management approach such that they can be properly evalu-
ated for their adoptability to secure a network of mobile small
cells. It has been the aim to include proposed mechanisms
such as the network initialization, key generation, key distri-
bution, key authentication, key update and key revocation.
Details regarding the involved mathematics, algorithms or
protocols are not discussed since these would not affect the
outcome of the evaluation of the key management approach
for adoptability in a network of mobile small cells covering
the urban landscape.
B. STRUCTURE OF THE SURVEY
Section II provides a description of the envisioned network
architecture in which mobile small cells enable the mobile
devices equipped with D2D communications technology to
communicate in a multi-hop wireless fashion. Each network
characteristic is individually evaluated from a security and
privacy standpoint and its challenges are described. Section
III gives an overview of the evaluated self-organized key
management approaches and provides a compilation of re-
quirements which a self-organized key management scheme
must satisfy in order to be suitable for adoption in a net-
work of mobile small cells. The following sections describe
and evaluate self-organizing key management schemes. Key
management schemes in section IV rely on certificate-based
public key cryptography (PKC), in section V they rely on
identity-based PKC, in section VI they rely on certificateless
PKC and in section VII they rely on symmetric key cryptog-
raphy (SKC). Section VIII compares the evaluated key man-
agement approaches and highlights the main considerations
affecting its adoptability. Section IX provides researchers
with insight about designing a self-organized key manage-
ment scheme for networks utilizing the network coding [25]
paradigm. Finally, section X presents some uncovered open
research problems and section XI draws conclusions and
outlines future research directions to design novel key man-
agement schemes suitable for providing security and privacy
in a network of mobile small cells.
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FIGURE 1. The scenario architecture as introduced by project "SECRET" [26].
II. MOBILE SMALL CELLS
A. A NETWORK OF MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The densification of the urban landscape by means of mobile
small cells and network offloading by means of enabling
D2D communications lead to a network which is capable
of increasing data rates and energy efficiency while reducing
latency and interference. However, many of these advantages
can be credited to the introduction of ordinary small cells.
Since the strength of a radio signal diminishes with the square
of the distance, replacing large transmissions to and from the
base station (BS) by multiple shorter transmissions provides
significant energy savings. Similarly, the shorter and less
powerful signals will reduce interference which allows for
a higher throughput and thus increased data rates. Lower
latency is realized by providing a more direct route between a
source node (SN) and a destination node (DN). Nevertheless,
mobile small cells provide additional advantages. They can
be setup on-the-fly, based on demand, at any place, at any
time, using existing mobile devices or Remote Radio Units
(RRUs) [11]. This wireless ad hoc network can therefore
function at a low cost since network operators are not re-
quired to install and maintain additional network infrastruc-
ture. Furthermore, mobile small cells support time and space
varying traffic [27], [28].
The EU-funded H2020-MSCA project “SECRET” [29]
introduces a scenario architecture for the next generation mo-
bile network which provides opportunities for both network
operators and network users. This scenario architecture is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
The cellular network, consisting of macro cells is par-
titioned into a network (or cloud) of mobile small cells.
Each of these is controlled and maintained by a hotspot (i.e.
cluster-head). This is a mobile node within the cluster that
is selected to become the local radio manager to control and
maintain the cluster. In addition, each hotspot is controlled by
a centralized software-defined controller. Through coopera-
tion these hotspots form a wireless network that has several
gateways/entry points to the mobile network using intelligent
high-speed connections. Data traffic between mobile nodes is
established through D2D communication.
Suppose that a mobile node wishes to share data with two
other mobile nodes. The mobile node in possession of this
data, the source node (SN), sends the data to the mobile nodes
requesting the data, the destination nodes (DNs). Note that
these mobile nodes are not required to be in the same mobile
small cell as illustrated in Fig. 1. Using D2D communications
and multiple hops, the data is being routed through the
network of mobile small cells from the SN to the DNs.
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TABLE 1. Summarizing table of security and privacy challenges in the proposed scenario architecture.
Networking technology Privacy threats Countermeasures
Multi-hop wireless communications Identity impersonation Identification schemes
Anonymous mutual authentication
Data modification Signature schemes
Integrity schemes
Eavesdropping Data encryption schemes
Free-riding Cooperation mechanisms
D2D communications Boundary attack Anonymous mutual authentication
Mobile small cells Lack of a trusted third party Self-organized key management
B. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES
The scenario architecture brings multiple networking tech-
nologies together. Each of these comes with security and
privacy challenges. The privacy threats can be divided into
two categories, identity privacy and data privacy. Identity
privacy threats cover attacks in which the attacker uncovers
identifying information about the sender or receiver, whereas
data privacy threats cover attacks in which the attacker un-
covers information about the transmitted data. The following
sections identify the security and privacy challenges for each
networking technology present in the scenario architecture.
1) Multi-hop Wireless Communications
Allowing data to traverse multiple hops to reach its destina-
tion brings a spectrum of privacy threats. To establish secure
communication between two mobile nodes, both nodes are
required to prove their identity to each other while remaining
anonymous to intermediate nodes. This challenge can be
solved with anonymous mutual authentication. With anony-
mous mutual authentication, both mobile nodes participate in
a so-called zero-knowledge proof of identity protocol. This
protocol involves the exchange of challenges in which both
nodes eventually prove their knowledge of a pre-established
secret. This secret (or key) would only be known by these two
nodes, therefore effectively identifying each other. Without
initial identification, communication is susceptible to identity
impersonation attacks. Furthermore, an intermediate node
could modify or eavesdrop on data in transmission. These
attacks are well studied and various cryptographic techniques
are developed to counter these attacks. Data modification
attacks can be detected using signature schemes and integrity
schemes whereas eavesdropping can be prevented using data
encryption schemes. However, each countermeasure requires
the communicating nodes to be in possession of a pre-shared
secret key [30], [31].
Multi-hop wireless communication is also affected by free-
riding. Free-riding means that a mobile node acts selfishly,
unwilling to route data to others while still requesting de-
manded data, for the purpose of increasing battery life. This
reduces fairness and transmission availability within the net-
work. Stimulating cooperation mechanisms are necessary to
prevent free-riding and several solutions have been proposed
[32]–[34].
2) D2D Communications
The introduction of D2D communications technology poses
location-based privacy challenges, since these data transmis-
sions require relative close proximity between mobile nodes.
This allows colluding users to perform a boundary attack to
locate nearby mobile nodes. Zickuhr [35] conducted a survey
and found that 46% of teen users and 35% of adults turn
off location tracking features due to privacy concerns. These
privacy concerns need to be addressed so that users will allow
their devices to be discoverable and participate in routing data
through D2D communications. Fortunately, location privacy
can be guaranteed using the identity preserving techniques of
anonymous mutual authentication [31]. As discussed previ-
ously, anonymous mutual authentication relies on pre-shared
secret keys.
3) Mobile Small Cells
The introduction of mobile small cells defines the parties
involved in the network. These involved parties are the mo-
bile devices and the network infrastructure. Neither of these
parties are considered capable of resisting compromise by
a malicious attacker and therefore cannot act as the online
centralized TTP. The online centralized TTP would be the
single-point-of-attack within the network such that denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks disable key management services.
Therefore, the core issue of mobile small cells lies in the
lack of a secure and trusted entity to establish security during
network deployment. This lack of a trusted entity poses
issues when it comes to the key management.
Key management schemes dictate how cryptographic keys
are generated, distributed to network nodes, authenticated,
updated, revoked and so on. These keys are then used to
perform cryptographic schemes, like the ones discussed pre-
viously. Key management is therefore the building block
upon which all security is based.
In the literature there has been key management schemes
proposed for similar network architectures such as MANETs
and ad hoc D2D networks, however these schemes are ei-
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ther incomplete (e.g., lacking key update or key revocation
procedures), they rely on a secure routing protocol or they
require some other form of a secure channel for (partial)
key distribution which is difficult to realize in our sce-
nario architecture. This exploration of security and privacy
challenges demonstrates that cryptographic techniques and
anonymous mutual authentication are able to provide secrecy
and anonymity assuming that an underlying key management
scheme can effectively support these. Therefore, it is of the
utmost importance to design novel key management schemes
which fit our scenario architecture. These schemes should
provide robust and low complexity key management includ-
ing secret key sharing among mobile nodes, key revocation,
key update and mobile node authentication.
III. SELF-ORGANIZED KEY MANAGEMENT
A. OVERVIEW OF SELF-ORGANIZED KEY
MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
Key management schemes can be classified in a variety of
ways. In this article, we have classified each key manage-
ment scheme by the form of cryptography which is used
and therefore defines the method of key establishment and
key authentication, the initial phases of key management.
The authors consider key management schemes to be self-
organizing when mobile devices do not have to rely on an
online centralized TTP to provide key management services
during network deployment. This classification of the pro-
posed self-organized key management schemes discussed in
this article are illustrated in Fig. 2.
In certificate-based public key cryptography (CB-PKC)
[36], [37] every network node self-generates its own math-
ematically linked public and private key pair. Next, each
node would contact the centralized TTP – also known as
the Certification Authority (CA) – which verifies the identity
of the network node and provides this node with a signed
certificate containing the public key and the identity of its
owner (among other information). This signed certificate
could then be distributed throughout the network to nodes
requesting to securely communicate with the owner of the
certificate. The signature on the certificate can be verified
such that the requesting node is confident that the public
key on the certificate is authentic. Since a network of mobile
small cells is unable to support an online centralized TTP,
this article presents five approaches based on CB-PKC which
propose alternative methods of providing a means to verify
the authenticity of public keys.
In identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) [38]–
[40] the identity of a network node (e.g., network address,
phone number) is used as a public key. This identity is public
knowledge and does not require certificates to distribute this
keying information through the network. However, corre-
sponding private keys cannot be simply generated from a
public key. Instead, private keys are provided by the cen-
tralized TTP – also known as the Private Key Generator
(PKG) – after it verified the identity of the network node.
Due to the inability to support an online centralized TTP in
a network of mobile small cells, this article presents three
approaches based on ID-PKC which proposes alternative
methods to providing network nodes with authentic identity-
based private keys.
In certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) [41],
[42] every network node combines two key pairs to establish
secure communication. A network node creates a mathe-
matically linked key pair, similar to the key pair used in
CB-PKC, while also using its identity as a public key and
its corresponding private key obtained from the centralized
TTP – also known as the Key Generation Center (KGC) –
after it verified the identity of the network node. Both of
these key pairs would be used for securing communication.
A network node wishing to communicate with the key pair
owner would request the (certificateless) public key and use
this along with the owner’s identity to secure communication.
The (certificateless) public key does not require to be authen-
ticated, since an adversary is unable to benefit from replacing
the public key for a false one. This is due to the identity-
based private key which is still unknown to the adversary.
The provided public key and identity can therefore be used
to secure communication, since only the owner of both
possesses the corresponding private keys. Again, due to the
inability to support an online centralized TTP in a network of
mobile small cells, this article presents two approaches based
on CL-PKC which proposes alternative methods to providing
network nodes with authentic identity-based private keys.
Symmetric key cryptography encompasses three methods
of establishing keys which can be verified for authentic-
ity [36], [37]. These three methods are named key pre-
distribution, key distribution and key agreement. For the key
pre-distribution and key distribution method, a TTP – also
known as the Key Distribution Center (KDC) – provides
network nodes with keys. With key pre-distribution, every
node receives a set of keys prior to network deployment
such that each key is shared with one other node inside the
network. The use of a particular key therefore informs both
parties who they are communicating with, thus authentica-
tion is provided along with the keys from the KDC. Key
distribution works similarly, however the keys are distributed
on-demand and during network deployment. Key agreement
is the only scheme which does not rely on a TTP. Network
nodes wishing to set up a secure channel follow a protocol
in which each node contributes some secret information to
create a shared key. However, authentication is necessary to
prevent a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, meaning that
each network node must have a means to identify the other
prior to establishing a shared key. This is only possible if each
network node is in possession of some secret information that
only they know, therefore relying on a pre-distributed secret
or a public key management scheme. This article discusses
research efforts following the symmetric key management
approach, however no proposal was eventually found to
be able to securely self-organize the key management in a
dynamic network.
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FIGURE 2. Classification of self-organized key management approaches.
B. REQUIREMENTS OF SELF-ORGANIZED KEY
MANAGEMENT FOR A NETWORK OF MOBILE SMALL
CELLS
Many cryptographic security solutions are available to solve
the security and privacy challenges in a network which
combines multi-hop, wireless and D2D communications with
mobile small cells. However, the difficulty of securing this
network architecture comes from its reliance on a decentral-
ized and efficient key management scheme to support these
cryptographic security solutions. This subsection describes
the seven requirements that a key management scheme must
satisfy in order to be suitable as a valid candidate for adoption
in a network of mobile small cells.
1) Security
The most important requirement and the main principle on
which cryptography is based on, providing security. The key
management scheme is expected to provide key management
services such that every network node is capable of estab-
lishing or obtaining keying material at any time necessary
(availability); that the key management service allows nodes
to obtain keying material from other network nodes while
having the ability to authenticate its validity (authentica-
tion); and that the keying material supports the use of data
encryption schemes to ensure that only the communicating
parties are able to understand the transmitted data (data
confidentiality), integrity schemes to ensure transmitted data
is secure against modification (data integrity), and signature
schemes to prevent a party from denying that it transmitted
the data (non-repudiation).
2) Connectivity
In this context, nodes are connected when they have a secure
means of obtaining necessary keying material in a verifi-
able manner. Therefore, a network has a high connectivity
rate when any arbitrary set of network nodes have a high
probability of obtaining each other’s keying material in a
verifiable manner. Additionally, connectivity is an important
requirement for network operators to consider if they are
interested in utilizing network coding while preventing data
pollution attacks.
3) Overhead
The overhead requirement encompasses the communication
overhead, the computational overhead and the memory stor-
age overhead. An efficient key management scheme mini-
mizes the overhead without compromising any of the other
requirements. The computational capabilities and the mem-
ory storage volume of mobile devices continues to improve
and is expected to keep improving over time. Due to this
ongoing development, these constraints are not considered as
highly impactful. Therefore, key management schemes are
mainly evaluated based on their communication overhead.
4) Scalability
Due to the network architecture being designed to serve an
urban landscape, it is considered that mobile small cells have
the capacity to contain large numbers of mobile devices.
However, the size of a mobile small cell is yet undefined
and will therefore not be bounded in any of the considered
key management schemes. Also, over time mobility causes
the number of users inside a mobile small cell to fluctuate.
The key management scheme must therefore be both scalable
in terms of efficiently supporting a large fixed network size
while also supporting dynamic network size changes.
5) Sustainability
The 5G and beyond 5G mobile network is considered to have
a long lifetime. Designed key management schemes must be
able to provide key management services from a security,
connectivity and overhead perspective. This means that the
key management scheme must resists any malicious attack
for which the attacker has an extended time to make its attack
successful, it is able to maintain a high level of connectivity
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TABLE 2. Variables, parameters and symbols.
Symbol Description
Ni Network node i.
Si Server node i.
IDi The identity of node i.
n The number of nodes in a network.
t The threshold value of a threshold cryptography scheme.
MPK The master public key.
MSK The master private key.
pki The public key of node i.
ski The private key of node i.
ppki The partial public key of node i.
pski The partial private key of node i.
si The secret share of node i.
|| The concatenation of values.
and the overhead does not grow based on events happening
over time. If a key management scheme is able to perform
these tasks for the entire lifetime of the network, then the
scheme is considered sustainable.
6) Fairness
Fairness implies that the overhead costs to establish and
maintain proper key management are fairly distributed over
all the network nodes throughout the entire lifetime of the
network. When the fairness requirement is not met, device
owners are more likely to behave selfishly (i.e. free-riding
behavior) and make their device unavailable to route data.
This reduction in availability indirectly reduces connectivity
and increases the overhead cost per node.
7) Secure Routing Independence
This requirement relates to the secure routing interdepen-
dency problem [43], [44]. Secure routing protocols, such as
[45]–[50] were developed for wireless ad hoc networks and
they rely on a pre-established and underlying key manage-
ment scheme to securely route data through the network.
Therefore, when a key management scheme wishes to utilize
a secure routing protocol to securely distribute keys, we reach
an impasse. Thus, it is important that a key management
scheme does not rely on secure routing [51], [52].
C. NOTATION
This article has limited the amount of variables, parameters
and symbols in the text by not including details of the key
management approaches such as algorithms, equations and
protocols. These details are omitted since their impact on the
evaluation for adoption is negligible. The variables, parame-
ters and symbols which are used throughout this article are
provided in Table 2.
IV. CERTIFICATE-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
SCHEMES
In certificate-based public key cryptography (CB-PKC), ev-
ery node inside a network can generate their own public
and private key. These public and private keys are mathe-
matically linked which allows them to be used for various
cryptographic protocols, such as the creation of unforgeable
signatures, the verification of these signature, the encryption
of data or the decryption of encrypted data. However, public
keys being distributed between nodes inside such a network
must be linked to its owner and be verifiable. Typically,
a node would contact a TTP – also known as a Certifi-
cation Authority (CA) – which verifies the identity of the
node. After verification, the CA creates a certificate for this
node, containing the nodes’ identity, its public key and an
unforgeable signature. The node is now able to distribute
this certificate to other nodes inside the network, which are
able to verify the authenticity of the certificate from the
signature provided by the CA. This CA is an online central
control point, which does not fit in a network of mobile small
cells. The authentication of public keys therefore requires an
alternate mechanism.
This chapter discusses five key management approaches
relying on CB-PKC. The certificate chaining-based ap-
proach, the mobility-based approach, the self-certification-
based approach, the partially distributed CA-based approach
and the fully distributed CA-based approach.
A. CERTIFICATE CHAINING-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The certificate chaining-based approach was introduced by
Hubaux et al. in [53], and later fully described by Capkun et
al. in [54].
1) System Overview
This approach relies on network nodes establishing a web-
of-trust, similar to the e-mail security system Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) [55], which allows for the authentication of
every node’s public key. The basic idea is that nodes which
have a pre-existing trust relationship uses this trust to sign
each other’s certificates, containing the node’s identity and its
public key. Suppose that nodesA andB trust one another and
decide to issue each other’s certificates. Both nodes create
a certificate for each other and exchanges these while also
keeping a copy of the certificate for their personal certificate
repository. Suppose that nodes B and C also have a trust
relationship and decide to issue certificates for each other.
When node A and C wish to communicate, without having
a pre-existing trust relationship, they merge their personal
certificate repositories in order to look for a chain of trust
connecting both nodes. Since node A trusts node B and node
B issued a certificate for node C, node A has reason to
believe that this certificate contains nodeC’s authentic public
key. However, when no chain of trust exists between both
nodes after merging their personal certificate repositories,
they have no reason to trust the authenticity of exchanged
certificates.
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FIGURE 3. Illustration of three main phases in the certificate chaining-based approach.
2) System Details
This system consists of five main phases. The network ini-
tialization phase, the certificate issuing phase, the certificate
exchange phase, the certificate repository update phase, and
the certificate chain discovery phase. In the first phase, the
network initialization phase, every node wishing to be a part
of the network creates their own public-private key pair. To
establish some initial trust and connectivity in the network,
[56] proposed to have a trusted secret dealer distribute iden-
tities and public keys of k arbitrary nodes to each network
node. The following four phases are performed throughout
the entire lifetime of the network.
In the second phase, the certificate issuing phase, nodes
issue certificates to neighboring nodes. When node A be-
lieves that the presented public key belongs to node B, it
will issue a certificate. This certificate includes the identity
of node B, its public key, the time of certificate issuing and
the time of certificate expiration along with the signature of
node A. Node A transmits this certificate to node B while
also keeping a copy. These certificates are stored in the node’s
local certificate repository. Trust relationships between nodes
can be displayed in a trust graph as shown in Fig. 3(a). This
is a directed graph in which the vertices represent the public
keys of nodes and the directed edges represent the issued
certificates verifiable by the node’s public key. There is a
directed edge from vertex A to vertex B when node A issued
a certificate for node B.
In the third phase, the certificate exchange phase, neigh-
boring nodes exchange certificates. Obtained certificates are
stored into the node’s local certificate repository. This cer-
tificate exchange mechanism creates awareness of trust re-
lationships in the neighborhood and is illustrated in Fig.
3(b). Node mobility forces this certificate exchange mech-
anism to be performed periodically. Instead of exchanging
certificates, [57], [58] proposed to exchange simple trust
relationship information to reduce the storage requirement.
Certificates would only be exchanged on-demand to establish
a certificate chain. The certificate exchange phase could even
be entirely removed [59]–[67] and instead have on-demand
routing protocols, such as ASNS [61]–[63], DSR [68] or
AODV [69], find certificate chains. However, these schemes
increase delay and communication overhead.
In the fourth phase, the certificate repository update phase,
nodes update their local certificate repositories. Due to the
limited amount of storage, the most recent certificates are
kept in storage and nodes update their respective trust graphs
accordingly.
In the fifth phase, the certificate chain discovery phase,
nodes wishing to securely communicate attempt to discover
a certificate chain. Suppose that node A wishes to commu-
nicate with node B, then node A first examines its local
certificate repository for a certificate chain connecting both
nodes. If node A is unable to find a certificate chain, then
node A contacts node B and requests its local certificate
repository. Node A merges both certificate repositories in
order to find a certificate chain. This process is synonymous
to merging both nodes’ trust graphs to find a path connecting
both nodes and is illustrated in Fig. 3(c). Once node A finds
a certificate chain, it verifies the validity of each certificate
to eventually verify the validity of the public key of node
B. Hubaux et al. [53] proposed two algorithms to find a
certificate chain. To simplify the certificate chain discovery
process, [70]–[72] proposed the use of a cluster-based hierar-
chy while [73]–[75] proposed the use of a (binary) tree-based
hierarchy. In case multiple certificate chains are discovered,
[64], [66], [70], [71], [76]–[79] proposed various methods of
adding a continuous trust metric to links in order to select the
most trustworthy certificate chain. According to [80], some
threshold amount of chains resulting in the same public key
should exist before it can be considered trustworthy.
Capkun et al. [54] described three scenarios in which
certificates are revoked. In the first scenario, a certificate
reaches its expiration time. In this case, nodes move this
certificate from its local certificate repository to a non-
updating certificate repository. To prevent certificates from
expiring, nodes within communication range of their cer-
tificate issuer can request a new certificate. In the second
scenario, nodes are allowed to revoke any certificate they
previously issued when they believe that the binding between
the node’s identity and its public key is no longer valid. In
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the third scenario, a node believes that his private key has
been compromised. This node contacts nodes which issued a
certificate to it and requests them to revoke these certificates.
The created revocation statements will spread through the
network during the certificate exchange phases. To more
rapidly spread certificate revocation information, [59], [60]
proposed to broadcast these statements immediately to all
two-hop neighbors.
To increase the security of this system, [67], [77], [79],
[81], [82] proposed to combine certificate chaining with a
partially distributed certificate authority (PD-CA) which acts
as a trust anchor. More details about the PD-CA-based key
management approach can be found in section IV-D.
3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is not met due to the reliance on the
assumption that trust is transitive while this is not necessarily
the case [83]. Node A may trust node B and node B may
trust node C, but node A may not necessarily trust node C.
Furthermore, trust is context-dependent [84]. Node A may
trust node B as a sports coach, but not as a security expert.
A malicious user may abuse his trust relationships to disrupt
communication. Furthermore, the certificate issuing process
is assumed to be performed physically to prevent malicious
MITM attacks. Seeking physical contact to issue certificates
is unrealistic in our scenario architecture and requires an
alternative approach.
The connectivity requirement is not met either. To estab-
lish secure communication between an arbitrary set of nodes,
there must be a high probability that a certificate chain exists.
This key management approach was proposed for MANETs
for use cases such as military and rescue operations. In
both cases, network nodes consist of users with many pre-
established trust relationships. This creates clusters of trust
relationship while inter-cluster relationships are established
by cluster-heads cooperating to achieve their common goal.
This translates to a network with a high certificate-density
and therefore a high probability of establishing a certificate
chain between an arbitrary set of nodes. The network of mo-
bile small cells consists of users with fewer pre-established
trust relationships. The certificate-density is therefore lower,
reducing the chances of nodes establishing a certificate chain.
Distributing keying information from a trusted dealer during
the network initialization phase could improve connectivity
[56], however this will have a reduced effect over time.
The secure routing independence requirement is not met
either. The exchange of certificate repositories seems to rely
on secure routing to counter MITM attacks.
No issues have been identified related to the overhead,
scalability, sustainability and fairness requirement. Based
on these evaluations, the authors believe that the certificate
chaining-based key management approach will not be able to
provide efficient and effective key management to support
cryptographic protocols and secure a network of mobile
small cells.
B. MOBILITY-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The mobility-based key management approach was intro-
duced by Capkun et al. in [85], [86].
1) System Overview
This approach uses network mobility to its advantage. To
establish secure communication, this approach proposes that
nodes initially meet physically in order for both to verify
each other’s identity. Both nodes would exchange keying
information (i.e. issued certificates) with their mobile devices
using a short range communications system (e.g., infrared or
wire). It is assumed that the exchange over this secure side
channel is activated by both nodes simultaneously and con-
sciously. By having short range entity authentication, some
of the classical ’remote’ entity authentication problems like
identity impersonation and Sybil attacks [87] are prevented.
Friends, family members and colleagues (users with a bi-
directional trust relationship) inside this network would sim-
ilarly exchange keying information offline or over the secure
side-channel. Simulations in [85] show that a reasonably long
time is required before sufficient connections are made to es-
tablish reliable communication inside this network. To reduce
this problem, they proposed that nodes sharing a common
friend can use that relationship to obtain trustworthy keying
information. This information can be transmitted remotely
since both nodes previously established a secure channel with
their friend. These simulations also show that the use of
the common friend mechanisms, to further distribute keying
information, can reduce the convergence time of reliable
network communication by a factor of 10.
2) System Details
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the certificate issuing phase, and the
certificate exchange phase. In the first phase, the network
initialization phase, every node wishing to be a part of the
network creates their own private key and the corresponding
public key. The following two phases are performed through-
out the entire lifetime of the network.
In the second phase, the certificate issuing phase, network
nodes exchange their public keys to each other in order
to issue and exchange certificates in the next phase. Due
to network mobility, nodes will physically meet every so
often. Meeting nodes which do not have any prior trust
relationship provide identifying information in order to prove
their identity to the other. If both nodes are convinced that
the other node’s public key belongs to the provided identity,
they use the short range and secure side channel (i.e. over
infrared or wire) to exchange keying information on their
mobile devices. This side channel ensures data integrity by
eliminating any active adversary. A series of exchanges pro-
vide both nodes with each other’s public key and a signature
to prove that the other node has the private key corresponding
to the public key. This provides both nodes with a secure
communications channel, displayed as mechanism (a) in Fig.
4. Details of the keying information exchange protocol can
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FIGURE 4. Mechanisms to establish security associations between
network nodes in the mobility-based approach.
be found in [86]. Nodes which have an existing bi-directional
trust relationship are called friends and they can similarly use
the secure side channel to exchange their public keys.
In the third phase, the certificate exchange phase, network
nodes distribute certificates. In mechanism (b) of Fig. 4, two
nodes A and B share a common friend F . Since friend F
previously exchanged its public key with both node A and
node B, it can issue fresh certificates on request and transmit
these to both nodes. Both node A and B are able to verify the
certificate provided by F , since they both trust F and have the
their friend F ’s public key. Mechanisms (c1) and (c2) in Fig.
4 are combinations of mechanism (a) and (b). In mechanism
(c1), node A has a friend F , who previously exchanged
keying information with node B. On request from node A,
friend F could issue a fresh certificate of nodeB’s public key
and transmit this to node A. Since node A exchanged public
keys with friend F , and also trusts friend F , it can verify
the authenticity of node B’s certificate. However, node B
exchanged public keys with node F after meeting physically
which led node B to believe that the public key of node F is
authentic. Node B has no further trust relationship with node
F , and therefore will not consider certificates coming from
and signed by node F to be trustworthy. Mechanism (c1)
therefore only provides a uni-directional security association.
Mechanism (c2) is a further expansion of mechanism (c1)
in which, using the same logic as before, can provide a
bi-directional security association between nodes A and B.
According to simulations, the common friend mechanisms
further distribute keying information almost by a factor of
10. To provide data integrity, [88] proposed the use of hash
functions in the creation of security associations such that
chains of trust can be established which are longer than just
2 links.
Capkun et al. [85], [86] also provide a symmetric key
management variety. Instead of having a common friend
which distributes signed certificates, the friend would act
as a trusted entity to provide both of its friend nodes with
a shared symmetric key. This shared symmetric key could
be generated by the common friend and distributed to both
nodes (like in the Kerberos protocol [89]) or one of the two
nodes would generate a symmetric key and the common
friend would relay it to the other node (like in the Wide-
Mouthed-Frog protocol [90]).
No details are provided about certificate revocation.
3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is conditionally met. Similar to the
certificate chaining-based key management approach, three
mechanisms are proposed which rely on transitive trust which
is not necessarily secure [83], [84]. This scheme is still more
secure compared to the certificate chaining-based approach
since the number of trusted entities involved in exchanging
keying information is limited to one. Nevertheless, explicit
security can only be guaranteed by omitting mechanisms
(b), (c1), and (c2) illustrated in Fig. 4. The disadvantage
is that reliance on only mechanism (a) further disconnects
the network. Furthermore, the physical contact required to
set up security associations is unrealistic in our scenario
architecture and requires an alternative approach.
The connectivity requirement is not met either. To es-
tablish secure communication between an arbitrary set of
nodes, there must be a high probability that these nodes
can establish security association with each other. However,
connectivity in this approach relies on the mobility intensity
and the validity period of issued certificates. As network
nodes become increasingly mobile, they meet nodes more
often and can establish more security associations. A longer
validity period also increases the amount of valid security
associations, unfortunately this also comes at the cost of
an increased memory overhead. Furthermore, this approach
is limited when it comes to connectivity in comparison to
the certificate chaining-based approach which can establish
security associations through friends-of-friends and beyond.
A small network may be able to provide a sufficient level of
connectivity, but this is not expected for a network covering
the urban landscape.
No issues have been identified related to the overhead,
scalability, sustainability, fairness and secure routing inde-
pendence requirement. Based on these evaluations, the au-
thors believe that the mobility-based key management ap-
proach will not be able to provide efficient and effective key
management to support cryptographic protocols to secure a
network of mobile small cells.
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FIGURE 5. Illustration of the neighborhood certificate distribution mechanism in the self-certification-based approach.
C. SELF-CERTIFICATION-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The self-certification-based key management approach was
introduced by Li et al. [91].
1) System Overview
In this approach network nodes issue their own certificates.
Upon nodes joining the network or moving into a new neigh-
borhood, nodes broadcast a request for certificate distribution
(while also sending their own certificate) to everyone within
their transmission range, also called their 1-hop neighbor-
hood. Every 1-hop neighbor responds by broadcasting the
certificates of all of its 1-hop neighbors. This certificate
distribution mechanism provides the newly moved-in node
with certificates from all nodes within its 2-hop neighbor-
hood. At the same time, neighborhood monitoring prevents
nodes from sending false certificates. Suppose that a node
has been compromised and sends a false certificate during the
certificate distribution process, neighboring nodes can detect
this false transmission. These neighboring nodes possess the
certificates of their 2-hop neighbors and can therefore cross-
check if a compromised neighbor sends any false certificates.
A node wishing to communicate with another node within its
2-hop neighborhood can use the certificate provided during
the certificate distribution. If the two nodes are more than
two hops away from each other and do not share each other’s
certificate, they can request a multi-hop certificate distribu-
tion. This multi-hop certificate distribution basically floods
the network in search for the node that the requester wishes to
communicate with and through chains of certificates, which
are verified at every step against malicious users, a route can
be established to share verified certificates and therefore the
public keys of each other.
2) System Details
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the neighborhood certificate distribution
phase, and the multi-hop certificate distribution phase. In
the first phase, the network initialization phase, every node
wishing to be a part of the network creates their public-
private key pair followed by a self-issuing of its certificate.
This is the creation of the certificate by the node itself in
which it signs it own certificate. The signature is created
from the node’s private key and the hashed information on
the certificate such that any other node can verify that the
certificate is created with a valid public-private key pair. The
following two phases are performed throughout the entire
lifetime of the network.
In the second phase, the neighborhood certificate distri-
bution phase, nodes broadcast certification information upon
neighborhood changes. Every node in the network period-
ically broadcasts hello-messages to inform other nodes of
their 1-hop neighbors. When a node N joins a new neighbor-
hood, a 3-step neighborhood certificate distribution process
is triggered. This process is illustrated in Fig. 5. In the first
step, the node N broadcasts a request for certificates of its
neighbors, while distributing its own certificate. In the second
step, neighboring nodes receiving the request verify the re-
ceived certificate for authenticity. Upon correct verification,
the node replies by broadcasting a message containing its
own certificate and the certificates of its 1-hop neighbors.
This informs the 2-hop neighbors of node N joining the
neighborhood while also informing the node N about its
2-hop neighbors. Finally, node N broadcasts a message
containing its certificate and the certificates of all its 1-hop
neighbors. This is necessary since node N may have created
a 2-hop connection between nodes which previously did not
exist. Nodes perform neighborhood monitoring during this
phase. Since every node is aware of their 2-hop neighbors,
they are able to cross-check if every neighbor broadcasts the
correct certificates of its 1-hop neighbors.
The third phase, the multi-hop certificate distribution
phase, is triggered when a node A wishes to establish a
connection with a node B and are separated by more than
two hops. Node A broadcasts a request message containing
its own certificate and the identity of node B. The 1-hop
neighbors verify node A’s signature after which they append
the request message with their own certificate and a signature
of this extended request message. Then, these 1-hop neigh-
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bors broadcast the extended request message further along
the network. The 2-hop neighbors and subsequent neighbors
verify the signature from the previous two nodes and continue
this process. Verification is necessary to detect any malicious
behavior. Nodes drop any returning requests such that the
request message travels from node A to its 1-hop neighbors,
2-hop neighbors, and so on, until it reaches node B. This
mechanism prevents a Sybil attack [87].
If a node believes that its public-private key pair is compro-
mised, it can select a new private key with its corresponding
public key and create a self-issued certificate. Also, when a
node’s certificate expires it can self-issue a new certificate.
The node then broadcasts a certificate revocation message
consisting of its old certificate, its new certificate, and a
signature. The 1-hop neighbors will verify this message and
broadcast it to inform the 2-hop neighbors. There is no
mention of a particular mechanism which reports malicious
activities discovered from neighborhood monitoring.
3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is not met. This is due to the
key management approach being outright vulnerable to an
impersonation attack caused by self-certification. Li et al.
[91] points out that nodes inside the network which have
previously exchanged the certificate of the real node have its
certificate stored in their certificate table and could therefore
detect malicious behavior over time. However, the imperson-
ator could cause major damages by the time this is detected
and reported. This impersonation attack is claimed to be pre-
ventable by creating a strong one-to-one binding between the
certificate and the public key of the user [92]. The viability
of this solution requires further investigation.
The overhead requirement is not met either. Due to this
approach relying on nodes being constantly aware of their
2-hop neighborhood to provide proper neighborhood moni-
toring and the network of mobile small cells being proposed
for an urban environment with a constantly changing network
topology, nodes are required to broadcast hello-messages
with rather short intervals. This causes a large communica-
tion overhead.
The scalability requirement is not met. An increase in
network density would indicate more topological changes
which further increases the communication overhead. Also,
an increase in network range (i.e. a larger portion of nodes
are more than 2 hops away from each other) would increased
the use of the multi-hop certificate distribution which relies
on flooding the network with broadcast messages in order to
find the requested certificate and public key. This scheme is
therefore not scalable from an overhead perspective.
No issues have been identified related to the connectivity,
sustainability, fairness and secure routing independence re-
quirement. Based on these evaluations, the authors believe
that the self-certification-based key management approach
will not be able to provide efficient and effective key manage-
ment to support cryptographic protocols to secure a network
of mobile small cells.
D. PARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED CA-BASED KEY
MANAGEMENT
The partially distributed CA-based approach (PD-CA) was
introduced by Zhou et al. in [93]. This approach distributes
the trust from an ordinary centralized CA to a proper subset
of network nodes and is therefore called partially distributed.
Zhou et al. implemented their online distributed CA [94],
[95] although not in an ad hoc environment.
1) System Overview
The general idea of the PD-CA-based key management
approach is distributing the trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to a proper subset of nodes inside the
network. This subset of nodes, called servers, perform the
certifying tasks collectively. Upon network initialization, a
master public-private key pair is created. The master public
key is made public while the master private key is divided
into n shares and distributed to the n servers. These shares
are created from a t-out-of-n threshold cryptography scheme
[96], [97]. In this key management scheme, a threshold of
at least t trustworthy servers is required to create a valid
signature on a certificate. An adversary needs to compromise
at least t servers to be able to reconstruct the master private
key such that it can create false signatures. To prevent this
from happening, [93] proposed to combine their scheme
with proactive threshold cryptography [98]–[102] and verifi-
able threshold cryptography [103], [104]. Proactive threshold
cryptography includes periodic share refreshing which means
that an adversary is required to compromise at least t servers
before these shares refresh. Verifiable threshold cryptography
includes a method of verifying the correctness of shares such
that a compromised server can be detected when its incorrect
share is used in an attempt to create a valid signature.
2) System Details
This system consists of three main phases. The network ini-
tialization phase, the certificate issuing phase, and the share
updating phase. In the first phase, the network initialization
phase, an offline trusted authority creates a master public-
private key pair. The master public key is made public and
the master private key is divided into n shares using a (n, t)
proactive threshold cryptography scheme [98]–[102]. The
shares are then distributed to n nodes inside the network
which will function as the distributed CA. These nodes are
called servers. This process is illustrated in Fig. 6(a). Zhou
et al. [93] did not mention a method for selecting servers,
however [105]–[111] proposed to select servers based on
physical security and computational ability, [112], [113]
proposed to select servers which have a high success ratio
of providing key management services, and [114], [115]
proposed to select the maximum clique in a trust graph as
servers. Each server stores the public keys of all the nodes in
the network, including the other servers, so they have a secure
channel. Every node wishing to be part of the network creates
their own public-private key pair. The following two phases
are performed throughout the entire lifetime of the network.
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FIGURE 6. Illustration of the three main phases in the partially distributed certificate authority-based approach.
In the second phase, the certificate issuing phase, nodes
wishing to be part of the network or nodes whose certificate
is soon to expire contact at least t servers to issue a certificate.
To contact t servers, it is assumed that [93] would resort
to flooding the network with certificate issuing requests.
To reduce delay and communication overhead, [105]–[108]
proposed to use cached routing information and [110], [111]
proposed to have the servers form a multicast group such that
a requesting node only requires to contact a single (uncom-
promised) server. Nodes provide the servers with identifying
information and their public key. Then each server creates
a partial signature and sends this to a so-called combiner.
Any server can act as a combiner and Zhou et al. [93]
proposed to have t servers act as combiners to create at least
one valid signature in the presence of compromised servers.
After a combiner receives t partial signatures, it combines
these into a certificate signature. The combiner can verify its
correctness with the public master key before transmitting it
to the requesting node. This process is illustrated in Fig. 6(b).
To reduce the communication overhead of the servers, [105]–
[111] proposed to have servers transmit the partial signatures
directly to the requesting node which combines these into its
signed certificate. The use of self-certifying keys [116] was
proposed in [117] since these require nodes to contact servers
only once.
In the third phase, the share updating phase, servers update
their individual shares to prevent mobile adversaries [118]
from collecting t shares. Each server creates subshares which
it distributes to the other servers. Then, each server combines
their original share with the received subshares to create a
new share. This new share is independent of the previous
share, meaning that a mobile adversary is unable to use
previously obtained shares to reconstruct the master private
key. This process is illustrated in Fig. 6(c). Algorithms for
periodic share updating and share updating due to servers
leaving and/or joining the server group are provided in [110],
[111], [119].
The certificate revocation mechanism in [108] proposed
that servers create partially signed revocation certificates
and broadcast these through the network using flooding.
These partial revocation certificates are stored locally in
each node’s certificate revocation list (CRL). When a node
receives t partially signed revocation certificates, it creates
the fully signed revocation certificate which is then accepted
as legitimate. Alternatively, [110], [111] proposed that nodes
report misbehavior to the multicast server group. At least
some threshold u accusations (from u nodes) are required in
order to revoke a node’s certificate. Revoked certificates are
periodically broadcasted and locally stored on a node’s CRL.
The identity of accusers is also stored at servers to track any
false accusers. To measure trust of individual nodes, [120],
[121] proposed the use of a Trust Management system which
decides whether a node is trustworthy enough to receive key
management services. This trust is measured by the node’s
success rate of transmitting data during its lifetime in the
network.
To increase scalability and improve availability by dis-
tributing the servers evenly, [122] proposed to have the
network partitioned into clusters such that each cluster-head
maintains the cluster structure and acts as a server of the
PD-CA. This inspired more research into a PD-CA with a
clustered architecture [123]–[128]. To reduce the memory
storage requirement, [129]–[132] proposed key management
schemes relying on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [133].
3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is met since the offline TTP dis-
tributes shares which provide trustworthiness in the collec-
tively signed certificates. Verifiable threshold cryptography
allows the detection of malicious behavior and proactive
threshold cryptography provides robustness against mobile
adversaries. However, a node wishing to join the network
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could be vulnerable to a MITM attack [134]. A malicious
node could provide the joining node with a false master pub-
lic key for which the malicious node has the corresponding
master private key. Fortunately, this attack can be prevented
when at least t combiners transmit the master public key
along with the signed certificate.
The overhead requirement is not met. The expensive cer-
tificate management and certificate distribution in this PD-
CA-based approach is believed to cause a large communica-
tion overhead for a moderate to large network which covers
the urban landscape.
The scalability requirement is not met either. The scal-
ability of the network is strongly related to the number
of servers acting as the distributed CA since these servers
must provide all network nodes with certification services. A
growth in the number of network nodes increases the pressure
on these servers and subsequently reduces its battery life.
For mobile small cells it is reasonable to assume that the
number of nodes fluctuate over time and could drastically
increase in certain areas during sporting events, concerts and
national celebrations. The limited amount of servers could
become incapable of providing key management services
at this point. This scheme is therefore not scalable from
a connectivity perspective. Temporary on-demand auxiliary
servers, proposed in [109], [135], may be able to reduce the
severity of this problem.
The sustainability requirement is met. Although it is rea-
sonable to assume that the assigned servers acting as a dis-
tributed CA may leave the network at some point, resulting
in an unavailable key management service followed by a
disconnected network, a solution to this problem has been
proposed. The key management scheme [136] is also based
on a partially distributed authority (although based on certifi-
cateless PKC) and proposed a mechanism to replace a server
node in the event that one would leave the network. Due to the
similarities of the key management structure, it is assumed
that this mechanism can be easily adopted in the PD-CA-
based approach. This approach is therefore sustainable from a
connectivity perspective. Furthermore, an extensive network
lifetime does not improve the abilities of adversaries to break
security or worsen issues related to overhead.
The fairness requirement is not met due to the imbalance
of overhead between network nodes. Even if servers are
replaced periodically in an attempt to fairly distribute the
key management tasks and its associated overhead over time,
user’s mobile devices which are temporarily assigned as a
server may still choose to act selfishly.
No issues have been identified related to the connectiv-
ity and secure routing independence requirement. Based on
these evaluations, the authors believe that the PD-CA-based
key management approach will not be able to provide effi-
cient and effective key management to support cryptographic
protocols to secure a network of mobile small cells.
E. FULLY DISTRIBUTED CA-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The fully distributed CA-based approach (FD-CA) was in-
troduced by Luo et al. in [137]. This approach distributes the
trust from an ordinary centralized CA evenly among all the
network nodes and is therefore called fully distributed. This
approach was later simulated and implemented in [138]–
[140].
1) System Overview
Similar to the PD-CA-based key management approach, the
general idea is to distribute trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to a set of network nodes due to MANETs
being unable to support a centralized CA. In this FD-CA-
based key management approach, trust is distributed among
all the nodes. It is assumed that each node has some one-
hop neighborhood discovery mechanism and that they have
at least t one-hop neighbors at any time. Upon network ini-
tialization, a master private key and the corresponding master
public key are created. The master public key is made public
to all network nodes while the master private key is divided
into t shares and distributed to a cluster of t neighboring
nodes. The cluster of t neighboring nodes, each in possession
of a share of the master private key, is able to collaboratively
create new shares for its one-hop neighbors. This mechanism
is used to spread shares to all the nodes inside the network
in a scalable manner. It is also used to provide nodes with
a share when they join the network. Similar to the PD-
CA-based approach, proactive threshold cryptography [98]
and verifiable threshold cryptography [103], [141], [142] are
combined to create, verify, and update shares in order to
provide robustness against mobile adversaries [118] and DoS
attacks. Each node creates their own private and correspond-
ing public key after which they broadcast a request to their
neighboring nodes to have its public key certified. When
the node receives t − 1 responses of partial signatures, it
combines these with its own share to create a new fully signed
certificate. Any node requesting its certificate can verify its
authenticity with the master public key and can therefore
be safely distributed through the network. This proposal is
designed to provide key management in wireless ad hoc
networks which are dynamic, scalable and have a high node
density.
2) System Details
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the certificate renewal phase, and the
share updating phase. In the first phase, the network initial-
ization phase, an offline trusted authority creates a master
private key (MSK) and the corresponding master public
key (MPK). The master public key is made public and the
master private key is divided into t shares using a t-out-
of-t proactive threshold cryptography scheme [98]. These
shares (s1, s2, ..., st) are then distributed to a cluster of
t neighboring nodes (N1, N2, . . . , Nt) inside the network.
Nodes within broadcast range of at least t nodes with system
shares, send a request to obtain their own system share.
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FIGURE 7. Illustration of the three main phases in the fully distributed certificate authority-based approach.
This system share is obtained following the 2-round protocol
described in [137], [138] and over time distributed to all the
nodes inside the network. This process is illustrated in Fig.
7(a). During network operation, the same process is used
to distribute a secret share to nodes joining the network.
However, [143] demonstrated by example that the obtained
secret share of a joining node is not verifiable. Various other
schemes proposed to establish a cluster-based [144], [145]
or a logical tree-based [146]–[148] hierarchy to organize the
key management service. It is assumed that a node which
joins the network already obtained an initial certificate, either
from an offline authority or from a coalition of t networking
nodes. The following two phases are performed sequentially
throughout the entire lifetime of the network.
In the second phase, the certificate renewal phase, nodes
whose certificate is soon to expire broadcast a request for a
certificate renewal. It is assumed that each node is equipped
with some detection mechanism to detect misbehaving nodes
among its one-hop neighborhood. When neighbors receive
the request and have no reason to believe that the requesting
node is not a well-behaving node, it responds with a par-
tial signature. This process is illustrated in Fig. 7(b). The
requesting node can verify the correctness of the received
partial signatures and combines t correct partial signatures
to sign and renew its certificate. To reduce the computational
overhead, [146] proposed the use of algorithms based on the
discrete logarithm problem since these are more efficient than
the originally proposed RSA-based algorithms.
In the third phase, the share updating phase, a random node
creates a coalition of t nodes to initiate share updating. Luo et
al. [137], [139] proposed a sequential process which is based
on the share distribution during network initialization, and
a parallel share update process. In the parallel share update
process the coalition collaboratively generates, encrypts, and
signs an update polynomial. This update polynomial is then
distributed to all the nodes inside the network by flooding.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 7(c). Each node receiving
the encrypted and signed update polynomial can check its
authenticity and decrypt it with the master public key. Then,
each node sends a broadcast message requesting subshares
from its one-hop neighbors. Upon receiving t valid subshares
the node is able to update its master private key share. At
the end of each share updating phase the old shares will be
destroyed and the new shares are used to handle certificate
renewal requests in the next certificate renewal phase.
Luo et al. [137], [139] assumed that each node is equipped
with some detection mechanism to identify misbehaving
nodes in its one-hop neighborhood. An example of a dis-
tributed detection mechanism is [149]. Each node maintains
monitoring records on neighboring nodes and a certificate re-
vocation list (CRL). Based on the monitoring records, a node
may believe that a neighboring node is misbehaving. In this
case, an accusation message is created, signed, and locally
distributed. Each node receiving the accusation checks if they
believe the accuser is to be trusted and if so, they create an
entry in their CRL with the suspected node’s ID and a list of
its accusers. A total of t accusations are necessary to convict
a node and therefore prevents a malicious node from falsely
accusing and convicting a well-behaving node. Once a node
is convicted, the t accusers create a signed conviction certifi-
cate and distributes this through the network. The extent of
the conviction certificate distribution depends on the time that
the convicted node’s certificate is still valid. The distribution
must cover enough nodes inside the network to prevent the
convicted node from “escaping” to a new neighborhood to
successfully renew its certificate before it expires. Nodes
with expired certificates are believed to be malicious and are
unable to obtain a new certificate. Also, in order to minimize
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the storage requirement of the CRL it is proposed to remove
entries of convicted nodes once their certificate has expired.
Various researchers proposed to make the threshold t
dynamic to maximize the availability and security at any
time. It is proposed to reduce the threshold value t when
the network density decreases in order to keep certification
services available [150], and to increase the threshold value
t when the network density increases in order to provide
security [151]. Alternatively, [152], [153] recognized that the
FD-CA approach provides availability at the cost of security
compared to the PD-CA approach and proposes a middle way
in which nodes have duplicate secret shares.
3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is met since the offline TTP dis-
tributes shares which provide trustworthiness in the collec-
tively signed certificates. Verifiable threshold cryptography
allows the detection of malicious behavior and proactive
threshold cryptography provides robustness against mobile
adversaries. However, a node wishing to join the network
could be vulnerable to a MITM attack [134]. A malicious
node could provide the joining node with a false master pub-
lic key for which the malicious node has the corresponding
master private key. Fortunately, this attack can be avoided
by having t well-behaving nodes transmit the master public
key along with the partial signature since a mobile adversary
is assumed to be incapable of simultaneously controlling t
network nodes. Furthermore, the FD-CA-based approach is
vulnerable to a Sybil attack [87]. In the Sybil attack a mali-
cious user takes on multiple (in this case at least t) identities,
thereby representing multiple nodes of which each has the
ability to obtain a share derived from the master private key.
For example, the malicious user could purchase t mobile
devices and register these with different network providers
in order to successfully register t devices and obtain t shares.
This would allow the malicious user to recreate the entire
master private key and break security within the system. This
attack can be prevented by implementing policies, such as
limiting the distribution of shares to one share per identity
(which can be maintained through identity authentication)
instead of one share per mobile device/SIM.
The overhead requirement is not met. The expensive cer-
tificate management and certificate distribution in this FD-
CA-based approach is believed to cause a large communica-
tion overhead for a moderate to large network which covers
the urban landscape.
No issues have been identified related to the connec-
tivity, scalability, sustainability, fairness and secure routing
independence requirement. Based on these evaluations, the
authors believe that the FD-CA-based key management ap-
proach will not be able to provide efficient and effective key
management to support cryptographic protocols to secure a
network of mobile small cells.
V. IDENTITY-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
Identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) [38] was
first proposed by Shamir in 1984, but it was not until 2001
when Boneh et al. [39], [40] introduced the first practical ID-
based cryptosystem. This scheme was later extended by Lynn
[154] to provide message authentication at no additional cost.
This form of public key cryptography originated from the
burden of obtaining authenticated public keys and the need
to reduce the memory requirement from storing certificates.
In ID-based cryptography, the identity (e.g., network address,
phone number) is used to derive a node’s public key. This in-
formation is already supposed to be known to a node wishing
to communicate with another node. Therefore, this ID-based
public key effectively removes the necessity to authenticate
and distribute public keys. The private key is obtained from
a trusted party called the Private Key Generator (PKG). This
PKG combines a master private key with a node’s identity
to create that node’s private key. However, this comes at the
cost of having the PKG as a single-point-of-attack and it is
capable of computing and storing every node’s private key,
also known as the key escrow problem. The obtained private
key can be used to decrypt and sign messages. Suppose that
node A wishes to send a message to node B. First, node A
creates a message, encrypts its message with the identity of
node B and then creates a signature using its own private
key. Finally, nodeA sends the encrypted message, the created
signature and its identity to node B. Node B can verify the
signature with node A’s identity, concludes that the message
comes from node A and then decrypts the message with its
private key.
This chapter discusses three approaches of establishing
secure, efficient, and reliable key management initially de-
signed for MANETs and relying on ID-PKC. The first ap-
proach (pre-distribution-based key management) includes an
offline trusted authority which distributes keying material
to network nodes prior to joining the network. The keying
material includes both public and private keys which are
used to establish secure communication channels between
nodes in a scalable manner and minimizes communication
overhead. The identity of nodes is used to derive which
keys should be used in establishing secure communication.
The following two approaches (partially distributed PKG-
based key management and fully distributed PKG-based key
management) provide private keys to network nodes by dis-
tributing the private key generating task of a centralized PKG
to a subset or to all of the nodes inside the network.
A. PRE-DISTRIBUTION-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The pre-distribution-based key management approach was
introduced by He et al. in [155], [156].
1) System Overview
This approach utilizes combinatorics to distribute public and
private keys while minimizing the memory storage require-
ment. In a typical network of n nodes, each node stores one
private key and n public keys such that every pair of nodes
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FIGURE 8. Illustration of the three main phases in the pre-distribution-based approach.
have access to a secure communications channel. However,
in such a key pre-distribution scheme the memory storage
requirement grows linearly with the size of the network. In
the approach introduced by He et al. [155], [156], a trusted
authority generates a pool of public-private key pairs large
enough such that every node will be provided with a unique
combination of private keys. This trusted authority will be
offline during network deployment. For example, a network
of 10 nodes only requires 5 public-private key pairs. Prior
to network deployment, each node will be provided with a
unique combination of 2 private keys along with the entire
pool of public keys. The memory storage requirement in this
case is limited to 7 keys. The use of combinatorics to dis-
tribute keys means that the memory storage requirement only
grows logarithmically and that makes this approach highly
scalable. After a node receives its unique set of private keys,
it derives its identity from the indexes of the received private
keys. By exchanging identities between nodes, each node
can derive which private keys another node has and uses the
corresponding public keys to secure data. Only the intended
node possesses the correct combination of private keys,
providing security. When nodes wish to join the network,
they would contact the trusted authority in an offline fashion
to obtain their unique set of keys. If not enough unique
combinations exist anymore, the offline authority generates
additional keys. The additional keys will then be introduced
into the network by the newly joining node, provided with a
signature which could have only been created by the offline
authority.
2) System Details
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the secure communication establishment
phase, and the new node joining phase. In the first phase, the
network initialization phase, an offline PKG generates a pool
of mathematically linked public and private key pairs. The
size of this pool of keys is dependent on the number of nodes
which are projected to be participating in the network. Sup-
pose a network is projected to contain ten nodes. Instead of
ordinarily providing each node with a single unique public-
private key pair and nine public keys related to the remaining
nine nodes, this scheme proposes the use of combinatorics
to minimize the memory requirement. To accommodate ten
nodes with keying material, only five public-private key pairs
are necessary. Each node, before joining the online network,
would receive a random and unique combination of two
private keys along with the pool of five public keys from the
PKG. This example effectively reduces the number of keys
stored at a node from 11 to 7. The identity of the node is then
derived from the indexes of the obtained private keys. Since
the set of private keys is unique for every node, the identities
will also be unique. This process is illustrated in Fig. 8(a).
Notice that a node must use all of their private keys to sign
or decrypt a single message to provide security. Algorithms
provided in [155], [156] estimate the most optimal values for
public-private key pool size and the number of private keys to
be held by every node for an arbitrary network size while con-
sidering the objectives of memory efficiency, computational
complexity and resilience requirement. To further reduce
the memory storage requirement, [157], [158] proposed a
clustering-hierarchy and requires nodes to only store the
public keys of its cluster members. This only provides intra-
cluster communication whereas inter-cluster communication
has to be routed through the cluster-head. Also, cluster-heads
are assigned to provide each cluster-member with appropriate
keys upon dynamic member changes. This proposal fails the
fairness requirement and causes additional communication
overhead by trying to improving on an already low memory
storage overhead.
In the second phase, the secure communication establish-
ment phase, a node A wishes to communicate with another
node B. First, the node A sends a message to request the
identity of node B. Then, node B responds with its identity
IDB . Node A inspects the identity of node B and derives
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the indexes of the private keys that node B possesses. Node
A uses the public keys corresponding to the private keys
in possession by node B to encrypt its data and securely
transmits this data. This process is illustrated in Fig. 8(b).
He et al. [155], [156] proposed that each node its identity is
a binary string of the indexes of the private keys it possesses.
For example, the network of ten nodes has a total of five
public-private key pairs. Suppose that a node received private
key number 0 and private key number 3. It concatenates
the binary values of these numbers to create its identity,
in this case 000||011. Any other node wishing to securely
communicate then uses public key number 0 and public
key number 3 to encrypt its message. Since the identity
of a node is used to establish secure communication, this
key management approach is classified as an identity-based
approach.
In the third phase, the new node joining phase, new nodes
contact the offline PKG to obtain its keying material such
that they can join the network. If there are still unused
combinations of private keys available, the PKG provides
each joining node with a random and unused combination
of private keys and the entire pool of public keys. Finally,
the new nodes derive their identity from the obtained private
keys. If all possible private key combinations are in use then
the PKG must generate additional public-private key pairs to
accommodate the new nodes. The new nodes obtain a new
unique combination of private keys from the offline PKG and
the extended pool of public keys. The node then derives its
identity from the indexes of the obtained private keys. Once
the new nodes go online, they broadcast the newly introduced
public keys to every network node. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 8(c). If the number of public keys has grown to a
higher power of 2 then every node also updates their identity
to contain sufficient bits. To prevent malicious nodes from
broadcasting fake public keys, the offline PKG should sign
the newly generated public keys.
He et al. [155], [156] mentioned that key revocation should
be organized by the offline PKG since this authority also
generates and maintains all the cryptographic keys. The
offline PKG could resort to signing key revocation messages
with every private key in the key pool, since only the offline
PKG has access to these and every node has the public keys
to verify the message. However, it is not mentioned which
entity distributes these revocation messages since the PKG is
considered to be offline.
3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is not met. He et al. [155] state
that their scheme is secure against an identity impersonation
attack, since a malicious node sending the identity of another
node leads to an encrypted message which the malicious
node is unable to decrypt. However, this scheme is vul-
nerable to an identity replacement attack. When a node A
wishes the obtain the identity of a node B, but intermediate
malicious node C replaces the identity of B for its own
identity then the malicious node can decrypt any message
sent by A intended for B. This attack is possible since the
identity in this key management scheme is not derived from
public knowledge, but works like a public key which requires
verification for authenticity. Furthermore, the combinatorics
approach which minimizes the memory requirement causes
vulnerabilities against a mobile adversary. Suppose that node
A (in possession of private keys sk1 and sk2) and node B (in
possession of private keys sk3 and sk4) are compromised.
Every node in possession of any other combination of two
of these four private keys are now vulnerable to malicious
attacks. Similarly, a malicious node launching a Sybil attack
[87] could collect private keys in order to break the security
of nodes having a combination of the obtained private keys.
The connectivity requirement is conditionally met. Under
the assumption that identities can be securely exchanged
and since every well-behaving network node is capable of
obtaining its set of private keys, every arbitrary set of nodes
is capable of establishing a secure channel, providing con-
nectivity.
The sustainability requirement is not met. This is due to
the lack of a proposed mechanism which deals with nodes
leaving the network. If the key management allows the reuse
of private key combinations and identities, then each node
leaving the network has to contact the offline PKG such that
it will be aware of recycling keying material. Then, the offline
PKG could decide to send a revocation message to announce
the inactivity of a formerly used identity. However, such a
message only presents itself when another node joins the
network. Furthermore, dynamic changes in network member-
ship would cause the constant flood of messages throughout
the network. It may therefore be more beneficial to not resort
to the recycling of keying material. This means that every
node will have a unique set of private keys and identity
provided for the entire lifetime of the network. Due to the
logarithmic growth of the memory requirement the overhead
may still be acceptable, however key revocation messages
will become unable to inform all network accessed nodes
of compromised keys. It is necessary to create an efficient
mechanism to deal with nodes leaving the network in order
to satisfy the sustainability requirement.
The secure routing independence requirement is not met.
This is due to fact that identities in this key management ap-
proach are created, like public keys are. Since these identities
cannot be verified, they are vulnerable to replacement attacks
by malicious intermediate nodes. The secure distribution of
identities of multiple hops would require a secure routing
protocol.
No issues have been identified related to the overhead,
scalability and fairness requirement. Based on these evalu-
ations, the authors believe that the pre-distribution-based key
management approach will not be able to provide efficient
and effective key management to support cryptographic pro-
tocols to secure a network of mobile small cells.
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FIGURE 9. Illustration of the three main phases in the partially distributed private key generator-based approach.
B. PARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED PKG-BASED KEY
MANAGEMENT
The partially distributed PKG-based approach (PD-PKG)
was introduced by Khalili et al. in [134]. This approach
distributes the trust from an ordinary centralized PKG to
a proper subset of network nodes and is therefore called
partially distributed.
1) System Overview
The general idea of the PD-PKG-based key management
approach is distributing the trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to a subset of nodes inside the network
while keeping the overhead as low as possible. The distri-
bution of trust is necessary since a MANET (for which it is
designed) is unable to support a centralized PKG. Instead,
the nodes forming the distributed PKG will provide network
nodes with their private keys. Upon network initialization,
n participating nodes create a master private key and the
corresponding master public key in a distributed fashion.
The master private key is created using the proposed t-out-
of-n threshold cryptography scheme [159]. A node wishing
to join the network uses its identity as its public key and
contacts t of the initial nodes to construct its private key from
the collected t partial private keys. An adversary wishing
to break the security of the system must compromise t of
the initial nodes during the lifetime of the network [118].
To prevent this attack from being successful, Khalili et al.
[134] proposed to include proactive threshold cryptography.
This means that shares are periodically refreshed such that it
becomes impossible for an adversary to compromise t of the
initial nodes within a share refreshing period. This provides
robustness against active attackers.
2) System Details
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the private key issuing phase, and the
share updating phase. In the first phase, the network initial-
ization phase, a set of n nodes collaboratively initialize the
network by deciding on mutually acceptable security param-
eters. These security parameters include the threshold value t,
particular parameters of underlying ID-based cryptographic
schemes (e.g., key length), and a policy for key issuing. This
initial set of nodes then creates the master private key and the
corresponding master public key in a distributed fashion. The
master private key is created using the proposed t-out-of-n
threshold cryptography scheme [159] such that each of the n
initial nodes obtains one share. This scheme also supports the
verification of the shares. These nodes form the distributed
PKG for an ID-based scheme, exchange their identities and
start issuing private keys to each other. The master public
key will be provided to all nodes joining the network. This
process is illustrated in Fig. 9(a). Alternatively, [160]–[164]
proposed to have an offline trusted authority select security
parameters, create the master key-pair, and distribute shares
of the master private key to n nodes in order to prevent any
malicious nodes from establishing insecure key management
during the network initialization phase.
In the second phase, the private key issuing phase, a
node wishing to obtain its private key contacts at least t
nodes which are a part of the PKG by moving into their
transmission range. The node provides PKG-nodes with its
identity and truthfully follows the key issuing policy to obtain
partial private keys. This node can use t correct partial private
keys to construct its personal private key. This process is
illustrated in Fig. 9(b). To prevent adversaries from launching
an impersonation attack, PKG-nodes should refuse to issue
keys for a particular identity more than once. However, this
will only be effective if n < 2×k and it requires PKG-nodes
to store the identities for which they already issued a partial
private key. A multi-level hierarchical scheme was proposed
in [165] in which a threshold of sibling nodes or parent
nodes can issue a private key. In contacting the PKG-nodes,
[160], [162] proposed to use the anonymous routing protocol
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MASK [166] to hide a nodes’ identity by using pseudonyms.
This prevents mobile adversaries from uncovering the PKG-
nodes, therefore having to resort to compromising random
nodes which significantly increasing the security of the sys-
tem. However, this may pose a problem when it comes to the
secure routing interdependency problem.
For long-term networks, [161]–[164] introduced an addi-
tional public-private key updating phase. Private keys can
be cryptanalyzed when the network lifetime is long enough,
meaning that these keys also require to be updated periodi-
cally. To do this, the public key is created from a combination
of the identity and a time stamp or key updating phase
number which corresponds to a unique private key for every
period between public-private key updating phases. In [165],
[167], [168] a scheme is proposed in which network nodes
determine which t out of n PKG-nodes are most likely to be
well-behaving and should be contacted for key management
services. This can significantly reduce the communication
overhead when t trustworthy PKG-nodes are contacted pe-
riodically.
In the third phase, the share updating phase, the nodes
forming the distributed PKG update their shares using proac-
tive threshold cryptography [118] to prevent mobile adver-
saries from uncovering the master private key. Due to the
exchange of identities and the issuance of private keys during
the network initialization phase, these nodes have access
to a secure channel to exchange subshares. This process is
illustrated in Fig. 9(c).
Key revocation mechanisms were proposed in [161]–
[163], [169] which use a Node Revocation List (NRL). When
a node notices misbehavior from a neighboring node, it
broadcasts an accusation to all the nodes inside the network.
The accused node is now classified as “suspect” in every
node’s NRL. When a threshold amount of accusations is
received within a certain time period, every node will reclas-
sify the suspected node as “convicted”. Any node will refuse
communication or key management service to a convicted
node and any accusations which came from a convicted node
will be removed in each node’s NRL.
To increase the scalability of this approach, [170] proposed
the use of a clustered hierarchy in which the cluster-heads
form the distributed PKG.
3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is conditionally met. As long as the
initial n nodes initializing the network are well-behaving,
trust is distributed throughout the network and the proper
creation of private keys can be verified with the master public
key. Proactive threshold cryptography provides robustness
against mobile adversaries and verifiable threshold cryptog-
raphy could be adopted from previously proposed schemes
[93], [137] to allow easy detection of malicious behavior.
Khalili et al. [134] mentioned that a node wishing to join the
network could be vulnerable to a MITM attack. A malicious
node could provide the joining node with a false master pub-
lic key for which the malicious node has the corresponding
master private key. Fortunately, this attack can be avoided
when at least t PKG-nodes transmit the master public key
along with the private key share. Furthermore, ID-PKC is
known to suffer from the key escrow problem. This becomes
problematic when an adversary is able to reconstruct the
master private key. However, it is assumed that no adversary
is able to collect at least t master private key shares within a
share refreshing period.
The scalability requirement is not met. The scalability of
the network is strongly related to the number of PKG-nodes
acting as the distributed PKG since these PKG-nodes must
provide all the network nodes with key management services.
This means that a growth in the number of network nodes
also increases the pressure on these PKG-nodes and subse-
quently reducing its battery life. It is reasonable to assume
that the number of nodes in the mobile small cells fluctuate
over time and could drastically increase in certain areas
during sporting events, concerts and national celebrations.
The limited amount of PKG-nodes could become incapable
of providing key management services at this point. Khalili
et al. [134] stated that network nodes are required to interact
with the PKG-nodes only once in order to obtain their pri-
vate key which reduces the impact, although this may not
be enough to considered this scheme to be scalable from
a connectivity perspective. Temporary on-demand auxiliary
PKG-nodes could be adopted as a solution, as proposed in
the PD-CA-based approaches [109], [135].
The sustainability requirement is met. Although it is rea-
sonable to assume that the assigned PKG-nodes acting as
a distributed PKG may leave the network at some point,
resulting in an unavailable key management service followed
by a disconnected network. A solution to this problem has
been proposed in [136]. This key management scheme is also
based on a partially distributed authority (althought relying
on certificateless PKC) and proposed a mechanism to replace
a PKG-node in the event that one would leave the network.
Due to the similarities of the key management structures,
it is assumed that this mechanism can be easily adopted
in the PD-PKG-based approach. This approach is therefore
sustainable from a connectivity perspective. Furthermore, an
increased network lifetime does not improve the abilities
of adversaries to break security or worsen issues related to
overhead.
The fairness requirement is not met due to the imbalance
of overhead between network nodes. Even if PKG-nodes are
replaced periodically in an attempt to fairly distribute the
key management tasks and its associated overhead over time,
user’s mobile devices which are temporarily assigned as a
PKG-node may still choose to act selfishly.
No issues have been identified related to the connectiv-
ity, overhead and secure routing independence requirement.
Based on these evaluations, the authors believe that the PD-
PKG-based key management approach will not be able to
provide efficient and effective key management to support
cryptographic protocols to secure a network of mobile small
cells.
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FIGURE 10. Illustration of the three main phases in the fully distributed private key generator-based approach.
C. FULLY DISTRIBUTED PKG-BASED KEY
MANAGEMENT
The fully distributed PKG-based approach (PD-PKG) was
introduced by Deng et al. in [171], [172]. This approach
distributes the trust from an ordinary centralized PKG evenly
among all the network nodes and is therefore called fully
distributed.
1) System Overview
Similar to the PD-PKG-based key management approach,
the general idea is to distribute trust from a single cen-
tralized trusted authority to a set of network nodes due to
MANETs (for which it is designed) being unable to support
a centralized PKG. In this FD-PKG-based key management
approach, trust is distributed among all the nodes. Upon net-
work initialization, all the nodes wishing to participate in the
network collaborate to generate a master private key using the
proposed t-out-of-n threshold cryptography scheme [173] of
which each node will hold a share. A master public key
share is computed from these and then distributed to every
network node such that everyone is able to construct the
master public key. When a node wishes to join the network,
it needs to broadcasts a request with identifying information
to at least t neighboring nodes. These neighboring nodes
decide on an expiration time, create the node’s public key,
and broadcasts this to all the nodes within the network. Then,
each neighboring node uses their master private key share
to create a share of the joining node’s private key and a
partial share for the joining node’s master private key. These
are then securely distributed to the joining node which can
construct its private key and its master private key share
upon obtaining t responses. This scheme is combined with
verifiable threshold cryptography so the authenticity of the
shares can be verified.
2) System Details
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the public-private key issuing phase, and
the master private key sharing phase. In the first phase,
the network initialization phase, the n initial nodes col-
laboratively initialize the network by deciding on mutually
acceptable security parameters and generating the master key
pair. Deng et al. [171], [172] proposed using the threshold
cryptography scheme as described in [173], since it removes
the necessity of a trusted authority. In this scheme, each node
contributes to the generation of the master private key by
generating their own secret and then distribute subshares to
the other nodes. Once the nodes receive all their subshares,
they combine these to create their share of the master private
key. It is assumed that the distribution of subshares take place
offline since there is no mechanism in place yet to do this
securely online. In [174], [175] it is proposed that nodes first
distribute a temporary public-private key pair to enable the
online distribution of shares. The master private key shares
are then combined with a common parameter to create master
public key shares. Each node broadcasts their master public
key share such that every node can compute the master public
key. This process is illustrated in Fig. 10(a). To remove any
malicious nodes participating in the initialization process,
[176], [177] proposed that nodes receiving faulty subshares
broadcast this as a complaint. To avoid any malicious nodes
participating in this process, [178] proposed to use an offline
TA to initialize the system and distribute master private
key shares. It is proposed by Deng et al. [171], [172] to
adopt a verifiable threshold cryptography scheme to detect
any invalid shares generated in the process, however there
is no consensus which particular scheme should be used.
Pedersen’s verifiable threshold cryptography scheme [104]
was proposed in [177], [179], Feldman’s scheme [103] was
proposed in [176] and Harn and Lin’s scheme [180] was
proposed in [175]. The following two phases are performed
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during the entire lifetime of the network.
The second phase, the public-private key issuing phase, is
triggered when a node wishes to join the network or when
a node’s public key is about to expire. This node contacts at
least t neighboring nodes to obtain its new public-private key
pair. To reduce the communication overhead and delay, [167]
proposed to only contact the t most trustworthy nodes for
key renewal. The most trustworthy nodes are selected based
on local information from monitoring neighboring nodes.
A joining node broadcasts a request in which it shares its
identity ID and its MAC address, which are assumed to
be unique and unchangeable. The neighboring nodes decide
on the expiration time of the public key and create the
public key pkID = H(ID||MAC||Expire_time) [141].
The MAC address and the expiration time are included in the
public key to protect it against IP spoofing attacks and com-
promised private keys. However, the variable Expire_time
may prevent a node’s public key from being directly derived
from publicly available information. It is therefore proposed
that the neighboring nodes broadcast the node’s public key
(also called the network identifier NID) to everyone in the
network. Instead, periodically updating public keys such that
the public key is a concatenation of the identity and the period
index number was proposed in [177]. However, this requires
some form of synchronization and every node would send
requests for a new private key at the same time. To reduce the
communication overhead, [179] proposed to create the public
key by concatenating the identity with a time stamp of issu-
ing and that nodes only renew their public-private key pair
when the node suspects that its key has been compromised.
Unfortunately, this allows undetected compromised nodes
to remain validated and cause further security issues [181].
After the public key is established, the neighboring nodes
combine the node’s public key with their share of the master
private key to generate shares of the node’s private key. These
private key shares are distributed to the requesting node who
combines these to create its private key. This process is
illustrated in Fig. 10(b). A detailed key issuing protocol is
described in [178] and claims to be resistant against replay
attacks, MITM attacks and insider attacks without relying
on a secure channel. However, this protocol relies on joining
nodes to publish a hashed password along with their identity
which need to be stored at network nodes and therefore
eliminates the memory requirement advantage of ID-based
schemes.
The third phase, the master private key sharing phase,
follows the previous phase when a node joins the network.
This node’s identity has just been authenticated by its neigh-
boring nodes and obtained its public-private key pair. These
same neighboring nodes create a partial share of the master
private key using their individual share. In order to protect the
secrecy of the shares of these neighboring nodes, they may
have to resort to some shuffling mechanism [138]. The neigh-
boring nodes then distribute the partial shares to the joining
node which combines them into its own master private key
share. This process is illustrated in Fig. 10(c). To securely
distribute the shares of the private key and the master private
key, Deng et al. proposed that the joining node presents
a self-generated temporary public key pktemp which the
neighboring service nodes use to encrypt the (master) private
key shares before distributing these to the requesting node. A
slightly alternative approach was presented in [182], which
uses Feldman’s verifiable threshold cryptography scheme
[103] to create master private key shares which would also
act as a node’s private key. These shares are verifiable using
the identity (or public key) of the node owning the share
and can therefore act as the private key, simplifying the key
management by combining the key issuing and the master
private key sharing phases. This scheme is also based on the
discrete logarithm problem instead of elliptic curves which
improves computational efficiency.
It is proposed in [179] that the network lifetime should
be divided into two distinct phases. An operational phase
(containing the public-private key issuing phase and the
master private key sharing phase for joining nodes) and a
master private key share updating phase. During the master
private key share updating phase a coalition of t nodes
collaborate to generate a random share updating polynomial.
Nodes within this coalition create subshares for each other
and are distributed. These subshares allow the coalition to
update their master private key share. However, no details
are provided how nodes outside the coalition are supposed to
update their master private key shares.
Deng et al. [171], [172] did not provide any details
about key revocation. Revocation mechanisms are proposed
in [169] and [181]. In these schemes a Node Revocation
List (NRL), analogous to the CRL in certificate-based key
management, is proposed. When a node notices misbehavior
from a neighboring node, it broadcasts an accusation to all
the nodes inside the network. The accused node is now
classified as a “suspect” in every node’s NRL. When a
threshold amount of accusations is received within a certain
time period, every node will reclassify the suspected node
as “revoked”. Any node will refuse communication or key
management service to a revoked node and any accusations
which came from a revoked node will be removed in each
node’s NRL.
3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is conditionally met. As long as the
initial n nodes initializing the network are well-behaving,
trust is distributed throughout the network such that the
proper creation of private keys can be verified with the
master public key. Proactive threshold cryptography could
be adopted from previously proposed schemes [93], [134],
[137]–[140] to provide robustness against mobile adversaries
[118] while verifiable threshold cryptography allows the easy
detection of malicious behavior. However, a node wishing to
join the network could be vulnerable to a MITM attack [134].
This malicious node could provide the joining node with a
false master public key for which the malicious node has the
corresponding master private key. Fortunately, this attack can
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be avoided when at least t nodes transmit the master public
key along with the private key share since a mobile adversary
is assumed to be incapable of simultaneously controlling t
network nodes. Furthermore, the FD-PKG-based approach
is vulnerable to a Sybil attack [87]. In the Sybil attack a
malicious user takes on multiple (in this case at least t)
identities, thereby representing multiple nodes of which each
has the ability to obtain a share derived from the master
private key. For example, the malicious user could purchase
t mobile devices and register these with different network
providers in order to successfully register t devices and
obtain t shares. This would allow the malicious user to recre-
ate the entire master private key and break security within
the system. This attack can be prevented by implementing
policies, such as limiting the distribution of shares to one
share per identity (which can be maintained through identity
authentication) instead of one share per mobile device/SIM.
Moreover, ID-PKC is known to suffer from the key escrow
problem. This becomes problematic when an adversary is
able to reconstruct the master private key, since this enables
the adversary to compute a node’s private key and therefore
break the security of the entire system. CB-PKC and CL-
PKC do not suffer from the key escrow problem, meaning
that backward secrecy is still protected against. However, it
is assumed that no adversary is able to collect at least tmaster
private key shares within a share refreshing period.
The scalability requirement is met. Although the proposed
master key-pair generation process does not scale to large
groups, this is not necessary during the network initializa-
tion phase. A large group during network initialization even
increases the chances that a malicious node is involved in
the initialization process. Additionally, scalable mechanism
presented in other distributed authority-based schemes could
be adopted [137]–[140]. This provides scalability from an
overhead perspective. Furthermore, nodes are able to join and
leave the network at any time without posing issues related to
security or connectivity.
The sustainability requirement is conditionally met even-
though the initial proposal by Deng et al. [171], [172] does
not include proactive threshold cryptography to prevent a
mobile adversary from collecting at least t shares of the
master private key over time. Mechanisms introduced in the
other distributed authority-based approaches which include
proactive threshold cryptography [93], [134], [137]–[140],
[183] can be adopted to provide resiliency against mobile
adversaries for this key management approach. This provides
sustainability in this key management approach from a secu-
rity perspective. Furthermore, an increased network lifetime
does not worsen issues related to connectivity or overhead.
No issues have been identified related to the connectivity,
overhead, fairness and secure routing independence require-
ment. Based on these evaluations, the authors believe that the
FD-PKG-based key management approach has potential to
provide efficient and effective key management to support
cryptographic protocols to secure a network of mobile small
cells.
VI. CERTIFICATELESS KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was intro-
duced by Al-Riyami et al. [41] in 2003. It was introduced
as an alternative to CB-PKC, which suffers from expensive
certificate management, and ID-PKC, which suffers from
the key escrow problem. It could be described as a hybrid
between CB-PKC and ID-PKC attempting to only keep the
benefits of each scheme. Therefore, a network node uses
two key pairs to establish secure communication. It first
creates a mathematically linked key pair, similar to a key
pair used in CB-PKC, while also using its identity as a
second public key and its corresponding private key obtained
from the TTP. This TTP is called a Key Generation Center
(KGC). A network node wishing to communicate with the
key pair owner would request the (certificateless) public key
and uses this key along with the owner’s identity to establish
secure communication. The (certificateless) public key does
not require authentication from a TTP since an adversary
is unable to benefit from a key replacement attack due to
the adversary not having access to the identity-based private
key. At the same time, the mathematically linked private key
is only known to the network node which prevents the key
escrow problem. The design by Al-Riyami et al. [41] limits
key management algorithms to ECC [42], therefore Baek et
al. [184] and Lai et al. [185] proposed their own CL-PKC
designs which does not have this limitation.
This chapter discusses two key management approaches
relying on CL-PKC. The partially distributed KGC-based
approach and the fully distributed KGC-based approach.
A. PARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED KGC-BASED KEY
MANAGEMENT
The partially distributed KGC-based approach (PD-KGC)
was introduced by Zhang et al. in [136]. This approach
distributes the trust from an ordinary centralized KGC to
a proper subset of network nodes and is therefore called
partially distributed.
1) System Overview
The general idea of the PD-KGC-based key management
approach is distributing the trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to a proper subset of nodes inside the
network. The network is initialized by a KGC and n nodes.
The KGC first generates a master public key and a master
private key after which it authenticates the n nodes and
provides them with an ID-based private key such that every
node is able to create their public-private key pair. During
the authentication process, the KGC selects k nodes which it
deems to be trustworthy and provides these nodes with shares
of the master private key created from a t-out-of-k (t ≤ k ≤
n) threshold cryptography scheme [186]. These distributed
KGC-nodes are able to provide key management services.
The offline KGC leaves the network and the network initial-
ization process is complete. When a new node wishes to join
the network, it has to contact at least a threshold t number of
KGC-nodes to obtain its ID-based private key from which
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FIGURE 11. Illustration of the three main phases in the partially distributed key generation center-based approach.
it can construct its public-private key pair. When a KGC-
node leaves the network, a set of at least t active KGC-nodes
select a random network node to replace the leaving KGC-
node. The KGC-nodes provide the replacement node with its
own master private key share, such that there are k KGC-
nodes active within the network during the entire network
lifetime. Zhang et al. [136] provides detailed algorithms for
the various key management services and they are based on
the work by Al-Riyami et al. [41].
2) System Details
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the private key issuing phase, and the
distributed KGC-node replacement phase. In the first phase,
the network initialization phase, there is an offline KGC and
n nodes which will initialize the network. Out of these n
nodes, k nodes are selected to form the distributed KGC.
First, the offline KGC executes a setup algorithm which
generates the master public key and the master private key.
Then, the offline KGC uses the master private key to create
an ID-based private key for each node and uses a t-out-of-
k threshold cryptography scheme [186] to divide the master
private key into k shares. The offline KGC distributes these
shares among k of the n nodes and the ID-based private keys
among all n nodes. This process is illustrated in Fig. 11(a).
Finally, the KGC publishes the master public key and goes
offline. Each node can now create their own public-private
key pair. The following two phases are performed during the
entire lifetime of the network.
The second phase, the private key issuing phase, is trig-
gered when a new node wishes to join the network. This node
contacts t KGC-nodes requesting shares of its ID-based pri-
vate key. Each contacted KGC-node authenticates the joining
node, creates a share of the node’s ID-based private key and
transmits this to that node. This process is illustrated in Fig.
11(b). Once the joining node obtains t shares of its ID-based
private key, it combines them to create its ID-based private
key. Detailed algorithms can be found in [136] and are based
on Al-Riyami et al.’s work [41]. An adversary could still
replace un-authenticated public keys to perform a denial-of-
decryption attack. This attack wastes network resources and
[187], [188] proposed to bind the public key of a node to
its identity and their ID-based private key to counter this.
Furthermore, shares of ID-based private keys are claimed
to be distributable over public channels since eavesdroppers
would not learn anything from the node’s combined private
key [187], [188]. However, security can be broken when
an eavesdropper learns about the ID-based private key and
succesfully performs a key replacement attack on the same
node’s public key.
The third phase, the distributed KGC-node replacement
phase, is triggered when a KGC-node leaves the network.
When a KGC-node leaves the network, a random non-KGC-
node is selected to take its place. Other KGC-nodes create a
partial master private key share using their own shares. These
partial shares are then distributed to the selected non-KGC-
node which combines them into its own master private key
share. This process is illustrated in Fig. 11(c). This phase
ensures that there are always k online KGC-nodes available
to provide key management services. It is not specified how a
leaving KGC-node is detected or how the KGC-nodes select
a non-KGC-node to replace the leaving KGC-node.
Key revocation mechanisms are proposed in [189], [190].
When a node detects malicious behavior it transmits an
accusation message to the KGC-nodes. A certain threshold
of accusations against the accused node is required in [189]
before KGC-nodes start to cooperate to generate a revocation
message and flood the network with it. Each node verifies the
revocation message and records the identity of the revoked
node in its memory.
No scheme within this approach mentions a master private
key share updating mechanism to prevent a mobile adversary
[118] from collecting t master private key shares and recon-
structing the master private key.
Many of the mentioned schemes rely on ECC which
suffers from computationally expensive pairing operations.
To reduce the amount of pairing operations [191]–[194]
proposed schemes which combine ECC with RSA.
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3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is met since trust is distributed
throughout the network and the proper creation of ID-based
private keys can be verified with the master public key. Proac-
tive threshold cryptography could be adopted from previ-
ously proposed schemes [93], [134], [137]–[140] to provide
robustness against mobile adversaries while verifiable thresh-
old cryptography could be adopted from previously proposed
schemes [93], [137] to allow easy detection of malicious
behavior. However, a node wishing to join the network could
be vulnerable to a MITM attack [134]. A malicious node
could provide the joining node with a false master public key
for which the malicious node has the corresponding master
private key. Fortunately, this attack can be avoided when t
KGC-nodes transmit the master public key along with the
ID-based private key share.
The scalability requirement is not met. The scalability of
the network is strongly related to the number of KGC-nodes
acting as the distributed KGC since these KGC-nodes must
provide all the network nodes with key management services.
A growth in the number of network nodes also increases the
pressure on these KGC-nodes and subsequently reducing its
battery life. It is reasonable to assume that the number of
nodes in the mobile small cells fluctuate over time and could
drastically increase in certain areas during sporting events,
concerts and national celebrations. The limited amount of
KGC-nodes could become incapable of providing key man-
agement services at this point. This scheme is therefore not
considered scalable from a connectivity perspective. Tempo-
rary on-demand auxiliary KGC-nodes could be adopted as a
solution, as proposed in the PD-CA-based approach [109],
[135].
The sustainability requirement is conditionally met even-
though the initial proposal by Zhang et al. [136] does not
include proactive threshold cryptography. Mechanisms in-
troduced in the other distributed authority-based approaches
which include proactive threshold cryptography [93], [134],
[137]–[140], [183] can be adopted to provide resiliency
against mobile adversaries. This provides sustainability in
this key management approach from a security perspective.
Furthermore, an increased network lifetime does not worsen
issues related to connectivity or overhead.
The fairness requirement is not met due to the imbalance
of overhead between network nodes. Even if PKG-nodes are
replaced periodically in an attempt to fairly distributed the
key management tasks and its associated overhead over time,
user’s mobile devices which are temporarily assigned as a
PKG-node may still choose to act selfishly.
No issues have been identified related to the connectiv-
ity, overhead and secure routing independence requirement.
Based on these evaluations, the authors believe that the PD-
KGC-based key management approach will not be able to
provide efficient and effective key management to support
cryptographic protocols to secure a network of mobile small
cells.
B. FULLY DISTRIBUTED KGC-BASED KEY
MANAGEMENT
The fully distributed PKG-based approach (FD-PKG) was
introduced by Li et al. in [183]. This approach distributes the
trust from an ordinary centralized PKG evenly among all the
network nodes and is therefore called fully distributed.
1) System Overview
The general idea of the FD-KGC-based key management
approach is distributing the trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to all the nodes inside the network. The
network is initialized by n nodes which collectively generate
the master public key and master private key. At the end of
network initialization, each node has a share of the master
private key which they can use to create ID-based private
keys to authenticated nodes and provide new master private
key shares to nodes joining the network. To prevent any mali-
cious nodes from creating false keying information, verifiable
threshold cryptography [103], [195], [196] is proposed to au-
thenticate keying information. To prevent mobile adversaries
[118] from collecting enough master private key shares and
compromise the system, proactive threshold cryptography is
proposed [98].
2) System Details
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the node joining phase, and the share
updating phase. In the first phase, the network initialization
phase, n nodes initialize the network following Pedersen’s
threshold cryptography scheme without a trusted authority
[195]. In this process, every node create its own secret, the
corresponding witness values and a subshare for every other
node. The witness values are broadcasted and the individual
subshares are securely exchanged. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 12(a). The nodes use the witness values to verify the
correctness of the obtained subshares and once a node obtains
enough subshares, it combines them into its master private
key share. Li et al. [183] does not discuss how each node
obtains the master public key. A solution to this was proposed
in [197], stating that each node creates their master public
key share from their master private key share and broadcasts
this. Each node combines t master public key shares into the
master public key. In [136], [198], [199] the presence of a
TTP is assumed which generates the master key pair and
distributes shares of the master private key among the initial
network nodes to initialize the network.
After each node obtains a share of the master private key,
they create a mathematically linked public-private key pair
and publishes the public key. A node then contacts its neigh-
boring nodes and requests shares for its ID-based private
key. Once this node obtains t valid shares it combines them
(and its mathematically linked private key) into its combined
private key. The following two phases are performed during
the entire lifetime of the network.
The second phase, the node joining phase, is triggered
when a new node wishes to join the network. This node
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FIGURE 12. Illustration of the three main phases in the fully distributed key generation center-based approach.
creates a mathematically linked public-private key pair and
publishes the public key. Then, the node wishing to join
the network presents its identity, public key, and some other
required physical proof to at least t network nodes and
requests shares of its ID-based private key and partial shares
of its master private key. Each contacted node needs to verify
the identity of the requestor prior to sending any keying in-
formation. If the identity verification succeeds, the contacted
node generates a share of the ID-based private key, generates
a partial share of the master private key, encrypts these using
the requestor’s public key, and transmits the encrypted keying
information along with the master public key. This process is
illustrated in Fig. 12(b). In [197] the existence of a trusted
authority is assumed which decides whether a node may join
the network. This effectively removes the identity verification
process by the contacted KGC-nodes.
Once the joining node receives at least t responses, it
decrypts and verifies the keying information. The t correct
shares of the ID-based private keys will be combined to create
the ID-based private key which in turn is combined with the
node’s mathematically linked private key to create its full
private key. The partial shares of the master private key are
combined to create its own master private key share. The new
node is now capable of decrypting any received messages
which were encrypted with its public key and identity, and it
can provide key management service to other joining nodes.
In [198], [199] it is argued that the initially obtained keys
should act as the personal master key only to be used in a
key derivation function to create keys which will be used for
cryptographic applications.
An interesting idea is discussed in [197]. It proposes that
the master key pair should continue to consist of contribu-
tions made by each node within the network. This means that
a node which joins the network creates its own secret, gener-
ates subshares for every node already inside the network and
distributes these securely to them. Each node then updates
their master private key share and generates a subshare for the
joining node which it combines into its own master private
key share. Master public key shares are also shared and
updated. Similarly, when a node leaves the network, the node
announces its departure and the remaining network nodes
remove its contribution from the master private key share
and master public key. This scheme updates keys upon mem-
bership changes of the network. However, this comes with
additional communication and memory storage overhead of
which the expense increases exponentially with the size of
the network.
The third phase, the share updating phase, is proposed
to protect the system against mobile adversaries. Such an
adversary compromises nodes one at a time in order to collect
t master private key shares such that it can reconstruct the
master private key and compromise the system. It is assumed
that a mobile adversary can only collect t−1 shares between
any consecutive share updating phase. Therefore, the share
refreshing phase is initiated by t nodes and uses verifiable
threshold cryptography to detect any malicious behavior.
These t nodes each select a random update polynomial and
securely send an update subshare for every node within the
network. This process is illustrated in Fig. 12(c). When a
node receives these t update subshares, it combines these
into a full update subshare and then with the original master
private key share to create a new master private key share.
This master private key share is independent of the previous
share which means that a mobile adversary is unable to use
formerly collected master private key shares and uncover the
master private key.
A key revocation mechanism is proposed in [190] and
is triggered once malicious behavior at a network node is
detected. A coalition of t nodes generate partial revocation
messages and the assigned coalition leader combines these
partial revocations. The coalition leader then distributes the
revocation message to all the nodes within the network. Each
node verifies the validity of the revocation message and, if
correct, stores the identity of the malicious node to deny any
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future communication with it.
To establish secure communication [183], [190] proposed
an interactive key agreement scheme while [136], [197] pro-
posed an encryption and decryption scheme. In each of these
schemes the public key of the other node is requested and
verified as a valid public key. However, the public keys do not
seem to be bound to the node’s identity and these schemes
may therefore be vulnerable to a key replacement attack
[188] which disrupts communication and wastes network
resources.
3) Evaluation for Mobile Small Cells
The security requirement is met as long as the initial n nodes
initializing the network are well-behaving. Verifiable thresh-
old cryptography allows the detection of malicious behavior
and proactive threshold cryptography provides robustness
against mobile adversaries. However, a node wishing to join
the network could be vulnerable to a MITM attack [134].
A malicious node could provide the joining node with a
false master public key for which the malicious node has the
corresponding master private key. Fortunately, this attack can
be avoided when t nodes transmit the master public key along
with the private key share. Furthermore, the FD-KGC-based
approach is vulnerable to a Sybil attack [87]. In the Sybil
attack, a malicious user takes on multiple identities, thereby
representing multiple nodes, to gather enough master public
key shares to break security. For example, this malicious
user could purchase t mobile devices and register these with
different network providers in order to successfully register t
devices and obtain t shares. This would allow the malicious
user to recreate the entire master private key. This attack can
be prevented by implementing policies, such as limiting the
distribution of shares to one share per identity (which can
be maintained through identity authentication) instead of one
share per mobile device/SIM.
The scalability requirement is met. Although the proposed
master key-pair generation process does not scale to large
groups, this is not necessary during the network initializa-
tion phase. A large group during network initialization even
increases the chances that a malicious node is involved in
the process. Additionally, the proposed share updating mech-
anism requires a flood of t subshares throughout the entire
network, whereas the proposal in [137]–[140] only floods
the network with an update polynomial. This mechanism
could potentially be adopted to minimize the communication
overhead. Then, this scheme provides scalability from an
overhead perspective. Furthermore, nodes are able to join and
leave the network at any time without posing issues related to
security or connectivity.
No issues have been identified related to the connectivity,
overhead, sustainability, fairness and secure routing indepen-
dence requirement. Based on these evaluations, the authors
believe that the FD-KGC-based key management approach
has potential to provide efficient and effective key manage-
ment to support cryptographic protocols to secure a network
of mobile small cells.
VII. SYMMETRIC KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
In symmetric key cryptography (SKC), a set of network
nodes wishing to securely communicate with each other are
provided with a shared key which they use for both encryp-
tion and decryption purposes. The secrecy of this shared key,
being only known by the involved network nodes, provides
security in this family of cryptographic key management.
Two main advantages of symmetric keys over asymmetric
keys (used in PKC) is that each key does not require as many
bits while providing similar amounts of security and that
cryptographic primitives, such as encryption and decryption
schemes like AES [200], are computationally more efficient
and therefore also more energy efficient. However, this gen-
erally comes at the expense of flexibility in areas such as
scalability and dynamic membership which are important
characteristics of ad hoc networks. The advantages of sym-
metric key management are particularly helpful to resource
restricted devices such as wireless sensors such that many key
management proposals for dynamic sensor networks (DSNs)
attempt to mitigate the disadvantages of having to resort to
symmetric key management. These resource restrictions do
not apply to the user equipments considered in our scenario
architecture, MANETs and ad hoc D2D networks and can
therefore enjoy the flexibilities offered by PKC. Yet, some
symmetric key management schemes have been proposed
for MANETs and ad hoc D2D networks while attempting
to mitigate some of the disadvantages. There are three main
classes of organizing the symmetric key management such
that network nodes can establish their shared keys in an
authenticated manner, namely key pre-distribution, key dis-
tribution and key agreement.
A. KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION-BASED KEY
MANAGEMENT
This class of symmetric key management schemes, inde-
pendently introduced by Blom [201] and Matsumoto et al.
[202], is organized by a TTP named the Key Distribution
Center (KDC). This KDC provides each network node with
long-lived symmetric keys during the network initialization
phase. These keys are generally used to create pairwise keys
to secure P2P communication. The exact pre-distribution of
keys depends on the security requirements of the network.
For a network which requires strong security, the KDC
would distribute a pairwise key for every pair of network
nodes. Every node in a network of n nodes will therefore
obtain n − 1 pairwise keys which causes a high memory
requirement. However, any pair of nodes which has not been
compromised by an adversary is guaranteed to remain se-
cure. A network which does not require such strong security
standards can use alternative key pre-distribution schemes
in order to reduce the memory requirement. These schemes
provide security against eavesdroppers as long as a certain
threshold of network nodes are not colluding and have not
been compromised [203].
Once every node is provided with keying material, network
initialization is complete and every pair of nodes can use
VOLUME 4, 2016 27
2169-3536 (c) 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2914359, IEEE Access
M. de Ree et al.: Key Management for Beyond 5G Mobile Small Cells: A Survey
their symmetric keys to establish a secure communications
channel between each other. During this time, the KDC is
considered to be offline. This is the only class of symmetric
key management that is resilient against dynamic topological
changes inside the network [204], [205] while the offline
KDC prevents adversaries from having to compromise only
a single target to compromise the security of the entire
network. However, a problem occurs when nodes wish to
join the network during network deployment. These nodes
are unable to establish pairwise keys with nodes which are
already part of the network. Suppose that the new nodes are
able to obtain keying material in an offline fashion from the
KDC prior to joining the network, the offline KDC is still
unable to provide the online nodes with keying material such
that they can authenticate the joining nodes and establish a
secure communications channel with them. Thus, the class
of key pre-distribution-based key management is unable to
support certain membership changes in dynamic ad hoc
networks [36], [37].
Two works [204], [205] proposing a key management
scheme for DSNs based their schemes on key pre-distribution
and claim that key pre-distribution is the only practical option
out of the three classes of symmetric key management.
Chan [206], [207] used this advice when he proposed a key
management scheme for a MANET in which he attempted
to solve the disadvantage of membership changes inherent
in key pre-distribution schemes. He introduced the use of a
large public set of private keys of which nodes would select
a random subset for personal use. Chan provided a shared-
key discovery protocol in which network nodes interactively
can discover which private keys they have in common while
preventing one another from revealing the private keys that
they do not have in common. These shared keys would then
be used to secure communication between these nodes. Chan
claimed that his scheme has a high probability that users
share at least one private key with each other while providing
resiliency against colluding (or compromised) network nodes
attempting to uncover shared private keys between other
nodes. Goratti et al. [208] proposed a similar approach to
secure communications for an ad hoc D2D network. Unfor-
tunately, Wu et al. [209] pointed out a flaw which nullifies
Chan’s claim and shows that either a high probability of a
shared private key can be guaranteed or resiliency against
colluding network nodes but not both at the same time
making the approach impractical. No other symmetric key
management scheme based on key pre-distribution has been
found which would make a suitable candidate to secure a
network of mobile small cells.
B. KEY DISTRIBUTION-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
This class of symmetric key management schemes is also
organized by a KDC. Each node wishing to participate in
the network contacts the KDC in an offline and secure
fashion to obtain a shared private key. This shared private key
enables each node to establish a secure channel with the KDC
during network deployment. When a network node wishes to
securely communicate with another network node (or a group
of network nodes) it contacts the online KDC and follows an
interactive protocol which results in each of these network
nodes obtaining a temporary common key. The class of key
distribution schemes therefore establishes keys on demand
and it supports both P2P key management schemes as well
as group key management schemes.
Key distribution schemes have the advantage that every
network node is only required to store a single long-lived
symmetric key which they share with the KDC and therefore
does not suffer from a large memory requirement as might
be the case in a key pre-distribution scheme. However, key
distribution schemes have several issues in a dynamic ad hoc
environment. Several key distribution-based schemes [210]–
[214] proposed for an ad hoc network rely on the online
centralized KDC to organize the key management which is
not only difficult to support but it also poses a security risk.
DoS attacks could make the key management service un-
available and a compromise of the KDC would compromise
all the keys that it issues. An ad hoc network could overcome
this single-point-of-attack by selecting a group of online
network nodes to perform the task of the KDC as is proposed
in [215] but in order to establish trust this scheme relies
on an underlying public key management scheme. Even if
a centralized or a decentralized KDC could be supported
and secured against malicious attacks, it may still not be
able to set up secure communication between nodes due
to communication range limitations, network partition and
link breakages caused by node movement or the unknown
network topology prior to network deployment. No symmet-
ric key management scheme based on key distribution has
been found which does not rely on a centralized KDC or
an underlying public key management scheme to make a
suitable candidate to secure a network of mobile small cells.
C. KEY AGREEMENT-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
In the class of key agreement schemes, multiple network
nodes contact each other to establish a shared symmetric key.
These nodes follow an interactive protocol in which each
node contributes some secret input in the creation of this
key. This key can then be used to secure communication.
The major advantage of this scheme is that the interactive
protocol is fully distributed, self-organized and it does not
rely on a TTP. However, this class of schemes also comes
with drawbacks.
The interactive protocol is not robust against the topologi-
cal changes and link breakages which occur in networks with
a dynamic topology. This is especially troublesome for the
establishment of a shared group key since this requires more
time and more message exchanges to complete the protocol.
Furthermore, key agreement schemes would also require sup-
port of a routing infrastructure since it is likely that two nodes
wishing to communicate are not within each other’s transmis-
sion range and therefore have to rely on intermediate nodes
forwarding messages. As already discussed, secure routing is
not available at this stage which means that these protocols
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TABLE 3. Evaluation and comparison table of described key management approaches.
Key Management approach Security Connectivity Overhead Scalability Sustainability Fairness Secure Routing Ind.
Certificate Chaining-based [53], [54] X X X X
Mobility-based [85], [86] X X X X X X
Self-Certification-based [91] X X X X
PD-CA-based [93] X X X X
FD-CA-based [137]–[140] X X X X X X
Pre-Distribution-based [155], [156] X X X X
PD-PKG-based [134] X X X X X
FD-PKG-based [171], [172] X X X X X X X
PD-KGC-based [136] X X X X X
FD-KGC-based [183] X X X X X X X
are vulnerable to MITM attacks. The only way to prevent
MITM attacks is by combining the key agreement scheme
with a mutual authentication scheme. These are also called
authenticated key agreement schemes (AKAS). Shen et al.
[216] proposed to include a short visual or verbal message for
the purpose of mutual authentication. Unfortunately, identity
and location privacy issues arise from this ordinary form of
mutual authentication. Anonymous mutual authentication is
necessary to tackle these issues. However, anonymous mutual
authentication relies on a pre-established secret between the
network nodes. This pre-established secret is provided by
an underlying key pre-distribution scheme [217], [218], key
distribution scheme (also known as a trusted server scheme)
or public key cryptography-based scheme (also known as
a self-enforcing scheme) [219]–[223]. Due to this reliance
on an underlying key management scheme, key agreement
schemes are not explored further in this article.
VIII. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF KEY
MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
Based upon an extensive evaluation, we summarized in Ta-
ble 3 the key management approaches and their abilities
to satisfy each proposed requirement. It is clear that many
key management approaches fail to satisfy every proposed
requirement to secure a network of mobile small cells. How-
ever, some failed requirements could potentially be resolved
by proposed solutions. This chapter compares the evaluation
of each key management approach and highlights the main
drawbacks and its ability to overcome these in order to be
considered as a candidate to secure the mobile small cells
network.
The certificate chaining-based approach [53], [54] is con-
sidered insecure due to its reliance of transitive trust. We
demand a high level of security which this approach is unable
to satisfy. Furthermore, if transitive trust is considered secure
for an alternative ad hoc network use case, the reliance on
secure routing to exchange certificate repositories still poses
a problem.
The mobility-based approach [85], [86] is only consid-
ered conditionally secure. Again, this is due to its reliance
on transitive trust. By eliminating mechanisms to exchange
keying material which rely on transitive trust, keying material
can only be obtained through mobility and close-proximity
authentication. This not only leaves us with a highly dis-
connected network, it also causes issues related to overhead
and scalability. This approach has the potential to satisfy six
individual requirements, however it is unable to satisfy all
of these at the same time. Furthermore, it is not realistic
to have device owners exchange keying material based on
mobility when they could simply rely on existing network
infrastructure to connect them.
The self-certification-based approach [91] generates a
tremendous amount of communication overhead in a dense
and highly dynamic network due to its neighborhood mon-
itoring process. This provides security and connectivity but
cannot simply be adjusted without breaking the entire key
management. This is the major drawback which makes this
approach unlikely to efficiently secure a network of mobile
small cells.
The pre-distribution-based approach [155], [156] is out-
right insecure due to the exchange of identities, essentially
public keys, which have no means of verification. This could
be resolved by secure routing, however this is not possible
at this stage. If a solution to this problem can be found, then
the pre-distribution-based approach still requires an efficient
mechanism which deals with nodes leaving the network.
All of the partially distributed TTP-based approaches (PD-
CA [93], PD-PKG [134], PD-KGC [136]) suffer from the
asymmetric relationship and workload of the network nodes.
This asymmetry promotes free-riding and could cripple the
key management and its provided security of the entire
network. Stimulating cooperation mechanisms will therefore
be increasingly difficult to develop.
Almost all of the fully distributed TTP-based approaches
(FD-CA [137]–[140], FD-PKG [171], [172], FD-KGC [136],
[183]) satisfy every requirement and has the potential to
satisfy these at the same time. Security challenges can be
overcome while these approaches provide connectivity, scal-
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ability, sustainability, fairness, and routing independence.
However, the FD-CA-based approach suffers from a compar-
atively large communication overhead due to the certificate
management and distribution. These approaches are based
on a MANET architecture. The adoption of this approach
for mobile small cells provides opportunities when it comes
to the key management and routing since assistance from
the network infrastructure is available. Overal, the fully dis-
tributed TTP is considered an approach worth pursuing to
secure a network of mobile small cells.
IX. KEY MANAGEMENT FOR NETWORK
CODING-ENABLED NETWORKS
A network coding-enabled network allows the encoding of
data at routers and the decoding at the receiver. Network
coding, introduced by Ahlswede et al. in [25], provides
significant benefits to networks in terms of bandwidth, energy
consumption, delay and robustness. Despite these advan-
tages, networks utilizing the network coding technology are
vulnerable to the so-called pollution attack. In this attack,
a malicious user controls a router and mutates data by pol-
luting them. Network coding causes this pollution to spread
downstream by encoding correct data with polluted data. This
leads to the inability to properly decode and retrieve the
information at the receiver. Pollution attacks therefore waste
many costly network resources. Data integrity schemes are
required to prevent any polluted data from being transmitted
any further through the network. However, this is only possi-
ble if the source node provides every intermediate node with
a piece of verifiable information and therefore must share
a cryptography key with them. The research community
proposed various integrity schemes [224]–[232], but they
all rely on an efficient key management scheme. Also, in
order to utilize network coding there must exist at least two
intertwined multihop paths between the source node and the
destination node. The most important requirement of a key
management scheme for network coding-enabled networks
is therefore connectivity.
X. OPEN RESEARCH CHALLENGES
This survey has identified two open research challenges
related to designing a suitable key management scheme to
secure a network of mobile small cells.
Key management schemes relying on a partially dis-
tributed TTP require a rigorous procedure for selecting the
most suitable network nodes to act as the distributed TTP.
The selected nodes could be random, based on physical
security and computational ability [105]–[111], trustworthi-
ness [112], [113], restricted mobility, maximum clique [114],
[115] or any other parameter. Furthermore, nodes acting as
the distributed TTP require a replacement procedure if any
decide to leave the network. The aim of the researchers
should be to prevent the selected nodes from acting selfishly
due to the overhead burden, while the key management
services are provided with limited delay. The many consider-
ations in the selection procedure keeps this process an open
research area.
Due to the lack of network infrastructure in MANETs,
key management schemes designed for this type of network
relies on physical contact to instantiate trust and distribute
keys. This form of authentication to secure communication
is not realistic in a network of mobile small cells, since
network users could utilize the existing network infrastruc-
ture. Network nodes wishing to authenticate each other on-
line therefore seem to require assistance from the network
infrastructure. Authentication schemes to secure D2D com-
munications have been proposed [23], [214], but it assumes
the network infrastructure to be secure against compromise.
An authentication scheme between these parties which pre-
vents distribution of sensitive and private data over insecure
channels is an open research area.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Covering the urban landscape with mobile small cells, as pro-
posed by the EU funded H2020-MSCA project “SECRET”,
optimizes network services such as data rates, energy effi-
ciency, latency, and interference in a cost-effective fashion.
In this network architecture, we do not assume the existence
of an online centralized TTP which is resilient against com-
promise. We believe that the network infrastructure is unable
to act as the trust anchor since network infrastructure could
potentially be physically broken into such that transmissions
of cryptographic keying material can be falsified or that
network infrastructure can become unavailable to perform
key management services due to denial-of-service attacks.
Therefore, a key management scheme which provides secure
communication between mobile devices within a network of
mobile small cells is required to decentralize trust and must
therefore be self-organized during network deployment.
In this article, we have studied ten key management
schemes which attempt to distribute trust. All of these are
based on PKC, of which five key management approaches
rely on CB-PKC, three key management approaches rely on
ID-PKC, and two key management approaches rely on CL-
PKC. No key management scheme based on symmetric key
cryptography has been found which successfully removes the
necessity of an online centralized TTP. This article explores
each studied key management approach extensively by in-
cluding many works proposing improvements, adjustments
or extensions of the original proposal. This creates a deep
understanding of each key management approach and their
potential when it comes to its adoptability into the proposed
scenario architecture.
Self-organised key management schemes must satisfy
seven proposed requirements in order to become eligible for
adoptability. These requirements cover security, connectivity,
overhead, scalability, sustainability, fairness and secure rout-
ing independence. Each key management approach has been
evaluated for these seven requirements and we have found
that only the FD-PKG-based key management approach and
the FD-KGC-based key management approach have the po-
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tential to satisfy all of them. The other key management
approaches were evaluated to be unfitting to properly secure
the network of mobile small cells due to drawbacks to which
no solution may exist. Therefore, as a future work we plan
to design a novel key management scheme utilizing ideas
proposed in the FD-PKG-based and the FD-KGC-based key
management approach.
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